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ABSTRACT 
The United States is in an era of renewed great power competition. This 
competition spans a multi-domain environment with a renewed focus on the 
maritime domain as China seeks to expand its global maritime influence. 
America’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been involved in primarily land-
based counterinsurgency for the last twenty years, and maritime and underwater 
operations capability has atrophied. This study examines the organizational structure 
and underwater operations record of the Italian Decima MAS frogmen during World 
War II. Utilizing Benjamin Jensen’s theories on innovative organizations, and a 
statistical analysis, recommendations for U.S. SOF underwater operations potential 
within great power competition are provided, based on the characteristics of Decima 
MAS’s successful organizational and operational examples. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1
A. PURPOSE ...................................................................................................1
B. CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES ...........................................................2 
1. Doctrine ...........................................................................................2
2. Sea Blindness ..................................................................................3 
3. Multi-domain Atrophy ..................................................................3 
C. ASSUMPTIONS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, SCOPE .........................3 
1. Assumptions ...................................................................................3 
2. Research Questions ........................................................................4 
3. Scope................................................................................................4
D. RESEARCH METHODS ..........................................................................4 
1. Primary ...........................................................................................4 
2. Secondary........................................................................................5
E. CASE STUDY SELECTION ....................................................................5 
1. Criterion I: Underwater Operations ............................................5 
2. Criterion II: Peer Level Adversary ..............................................6 
3. Criterion III: Sustained Offensive Operations............................7 
F. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................7 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................11 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................11
B. U.S. STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE .....................................................11 
C. THE ROLE OF SOF IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION ............12 
D. SOF UNDERWATER OPERATIONS ..................................................13 
E. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................16 
III. DECIMA MAS ORGANIZATIONAL CASE STUDY .....................................17 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................17
B. STRATEGIC CONTEXT: ITALY AND GREAT BRITAIN .............17 
C. A SECRET WEAPON .............................................................................18 
1. Early Beginnings ..........................................................................18 
2. The Birth of the Decima MAS ....................................................19 
3. Institutional Challenges ...............................................................19 
4. First Operational Tests ................................................................20 
D. ORGANIZATION, SELECTION, AND TRAINING ..........................21 
1. Organization .................................................................................21
2. Selection and Training .................................................................22 
viii 
E. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND EQUIPMENT.................26 
1. SLCs ..............................................................................................26 
2. Gamma Group .............................................................................27 
F. ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS.........................................................28 
1. Foundational Theory ...................................................................28 
2. Theory Applied.............................................................................30 
3. Jensen’s Theory and the Decima MAS ......................................31 
G. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................32 
IV. DECIMA MAS OPERATIONS CASE STUDY ................................................35 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................35
B. EARLY FAILURES AND SETBACKS ................................................35 
1. Submarine Iride SLC Attempt against Alexandria 25–26
August 1940 ..................................................................................35 
2. Submarine Gondar SLC Attempt against Alexandria 29
September 1940 ............................................................................36 
3. Submarine Scire SLC Attempt against Gibraltar 29
September 1940 – Abort ..............................................................37 
4. Submarine Scire SLC attack at Gibraltar 30 October
1940 – Failure ...............................................................................38 
5. Submarine Scire SLC Attack against Gibraltar 26 May
1941 – Failure ...............................................................................39 
6. Sloop Diana SLC Attack at Malta 26 July 1941 – Failure .......40 
C. FIRST SUCCESS WITH THE NEW WEAPON .................................41 
1. Submarine Scire SLC Attack against Gibraltar Sep 20–21
1941 – Success ...............................................................................41 
2. Scire SLC Attack against Alexandria 18th December
1941 – Success ...............................................................................43 
3. Ambra SLC Attack against Alexandria 14 May 1942 –
Failure ...........................................................................................44 
D. A SHIFTING STRATEGY: ENTER THE GAMMA MEN ................44 
1. Gamma Swimmer Attack from the Villa Carmella 14
July 1942 – Success ......................................................................46 
2. Scire Gamma Attempt on Haifa/El Daba 10 August 1942
– Failure ........................................................................................48 
E. THE PLOT THICKENS: THE STORY OF THE OLTERRA ...........48 
1. Villa Carmela 2nd Gamma Attack on Gibraltar 14–15
September 1942 – Success ...........................................................50 
2. Olterra SLC Attack on Gibraltar 8 December 1942 –
Failure ...........................................................................................50 
ix 
3. Ambra SLC and Gamma Joint Attack against Algiers 11
Dec 1942 – Success .......................................................................51 
4. Olterra SLC 2nd Mission against Gibraltar 8 May 1943 –
Success ...........................................................................................51 
5. Olterra SLC Final Attack at Gibraltar 4 August 1943 –
Success ...........................................................................................52 
F. FINAL ACT: AN ACTIVE DEFENSE..................................................54 
1. 17 Sub Lieutenant Ferraro’s attack at Alexandretta 30
June 1943 – Success .....................................................................56 
2. 18 Ferraro’s attack at Mersina 8 July 1943 – Success ..............57 
3. 19 Ferraro’s second attack at Mersina 30 July 1943 –
Fail* ...............................................................................................57 
4. 20 Ferraro’s second attack at Alexandretta 2 August 1943
– Success ........................................................................................57
G. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DECIMA MAS
UNDERWATER OPERATIONS ...........................................................59 
1. Introduction ..................................................................................59
2. Success Criteria 1 .........................................................................60 
3. Success Criteria 2 .........................................................................61 
4. Success Criteria 3 .........................................................................62 
5. Conclusion ....................................................................................63 
H. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS OF DECIMA MAS OPERATIONS ......64 
V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................67 
A. FINDINGS APPLICABLE TO U.S. SOF .............................................67 
1. Organizational ..............................................................................67
2. Operational ...................................................................................68
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. SPECIAL FORCES....................69 
1. Context and Challenges ...............................................................69 
2. Doctrine .........................................................................................70
3. Sea Blindness ................................................................................71 
4. Multi-domain Atrophy ................................................................71 
APPENDIX: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ....................................................................73 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................75 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................77 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. SLC Pilot ....................................................................................................24 
Figure 2. Gamma Swimmer ......................................................................................26 
Figure 3. Incubator and Advocacy Networks Model ................................................30 
Figure 4. Model Applied to Decima Organizational Structure .................................32 
Figure 5. Gibraltar Operational Area ........................................................................54 
Figure 6. Ferraro’s Gamma Operations .....................................................................58 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Success Criterion 1 Contingency Table .....................................................60 
Table 2. Success Criteria 2 Contingency Table .......................................................61 
Table 3. Success Criteria 3 Contingency Table .......................................................62 
xiv 
xv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AFCDC Air Force Combatant Diver Course 
AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command 
ARSOF Army Special Operations Forces 
BUD/S Basic Underwater Demolitions/SEAL 
FMF Fleet Marine Force 
GPC Great Power Competition 
GWOT Global War on Terror 
MARSOC Marine Special Operations Command 
MAS Motoscafi Anti Sommergibili 
MCDC Marine Combatant Diver Course 
NDS National Defense Strategy 
NSS National Security Strategy 
ODA Operational Detachment Alpha 
OSS Office of Strategic Services 
RAF Royal Air Force 
RNCD Royal Navy Clearance Divers 
SCUBA Self Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus 
SDV Swimmer Delivery Vehicle 
SEAL Sea, Air, Land 
SLC Siluro a Lenta Corsa 
SRU Sea Reconnaissance Unit 
UDT Underwater Demolition Team 
USSF United States Special Forces 
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 
UWO Underwater Operations 
xvi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xvii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank my advisor Dr. Kalev Sepp for his continued support, 
including directing me to various experts and outside sources to assist in my research. Also 
to Dr. Barry Strauss for his sage advice to avoid confirmation bias and his feedback as a 
second reader. I would also like to thank Dr. Robert Burks for his assistance with my 
statistical analysis for this work. Finally, I will always be indebted to my family first and 
foremost for their continued support during this process and my entire military career. 
This work is dedicated to all of America’s Underwater Warriors past, 
present, and future.  
De Oppresso Liber. 
xviii 




Since the end of World War II U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) has built and
maintained a robust underwater operations capability. Although combat diving or combat 
swimming is most closely associated with the U.S. Navy SEALs, each SOF component 
within the Department of Defense possesses an underwater capability.1 U.S. Army Special 
Forces in particular recognized a need for and developed the capability since its earliest 
inception as the original special operations unit capable of operating from the Air, Land, 
and Sea almost a decade before the creation of the Navy’s SEAL teams.2 In today’s joint 
environment, underwater operations and the maritime domain are the responsibility of the 
entire SOF enterprise. The purpose of this study is to assess the role SOF underwater 
capability will play in the competitive space and in preparing for future conflicts with a 
peer level threats. 
This chapter will establish why a greater maritime domain awareness and expertise 
for U.S. SOF is both relevant and essential to maintaining the competitive edge and 
imposing real costs on our adversaries. Once the context of the strategic environment is set 
an examination of the unique options U.S. SOF underwater capability can provide will be 
examined. Case study selection criteria and methodology for analysis will focus the scope 
of the study and provide a solid foundation for an accurate assessment of the potential 
utilization of underwater operations in the future. This study aims to answer three 
questions: 
1. What role will SOF underwater capability play in Great Power
Competition, and what capability gaps exist that must be addressed for the
U.S. and her allies to remain competitive?
1 Air Land Sea Application Center, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military 
Diving Operations (ALSA, 2019), x, http://www/alsa.mil/. 
2 Kenneth Finlayson, “Key West: Home of ARSOF Underwater Operations,” Veritas 3, no. 1 (2007): 
1.
2 
2. What underwater capabilities must U.S. SOF be prepared to execute 
throughout the competitive space and conflict continuum?  
3. How can SOF underwater capabilities be leveraged by, with, and through 
partner forces in the Competitive space? 
B. CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES 
While the joint operational environment of Iraq and Afghanistan has led to greater 
interoperability between U.S. SOF conducting joint and combined land operations the same 
“Jointness” among U.S. SOF does not extend to the maritime domain. As a result. While 
there is seemingly no doctrinal or institutional opposition to the U.S. Navy’s “frogmen” 
conducting land operations thousands of miles from the nearest sea, and in fact it has 
become the status quo; often the very suggestion of non-Naval SOF conducting maritime 
or underwater operations is met with great institutional resistance. This is despite both the 
doctrinal mandate and historical precedence for each SOF service to maintain an 
underwater capability.3 This study posits that this organizational resistance is normally 
attributed to three shortfalls:  
1. Doctrine  
Traditionally, the myriad U.S. SOF, core missions and tasks are required to be 
executed throughout a multi-domain environment regardless of service branch.4 Yet while 
there exists standardization and interoperability in underwater capability between U.S. 
SOF, the doctrinal guidance for the use of underwater capability by U.S. SOF is overly 
stratified, rigid, and conflict-focused.5 This doctrinal limitation ignores both the potential 
for underwater operations to provide a means to an end within the accomplishment of the 
various core tasks; and how underwater capability could provide a critical enabling skill in 
 
3 Air Land Sea Application Center, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military 
Diving Operations, 1. 
4 Doctrine For Army Special Operations Forces FM 100-25 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters 
Department of the Army, 1991), 1–1. 
5 Air Land Sea Application Center, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military 
Diving Operations, 57. 
3 
the accomplishment of the core tasks across the spectrum of permissive through denied 
environments within the competitive space short of conflict. 
2. Sea Blindness  
“Sea Blindness” is a tendency for organizations primarily focused on land-based 
operations to ignore the maritime domain. While not unique to any single organization, 
these terrain-based blinders inhibit SOF planners from recognizing the maritime domain 
and littoral regions as maneuver space. Often opting instead to regard the maritime domain 
and the littorals as at best an obstacle to be overcome or avoided and at worst the sole 
responsibility of the conventional Naval services.6 
3. Multi-domain Atrophy 
Given the fact that the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have been primarily land-
based and have not provided a recent opportunity to highlight the efficacy or potential of 
SOF underwater capability, maritime and underwater domain awareness has languished 
and atrophied across the force. Worse yet, the lack of recent relevant operational examples 
has produced an active resistance at the unit level toward spending training time and 
resources on maintaining and developing SOF underwater capability. 
These fundamental shortfalls have produced a disparity between doctrine, training, 
and operational employment within the SOF underwater operations community. This 
disparity comes at a time when a renewed emphasis on the importance of the maritime 
domain within the context of Great Power Competition has begun to highlight the potential 
contributions of SOF underwater capabilities within a holistic maritime grand strategy to 
counter the strategic aims of the adversaries of the United States. 
C. ASSUMPTIONS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, SCOPE 
1. Assumptions 
For the purpose of this study several assumptions will be made: 
 
6 Meghan Curran Et Al., “Violence At Sea: How Terrorists, Insurgents, And Other Extremists Exploit 
The Maritime Domain,” Stable Seas, August 2020, 1. 
4 
∑ U.S. SOF will be required to operate in a multi-domain environment 
∑ Military planners will seek SOF options that impose real costs within the 
competitive space vs. simply preparing for future high intensity conflict. 
∑ U.S. adversaries’ strategic goals will inform U.S. SOF strategic 
employment 
2. Research Questions 
This study asks the questions: What role will Special Operations undersea warfare 
play in Great Power Competition, and what capability gaps exist that must be addressed 
for the U.S. and her allies to remain competitive, what underwater operations capabilities 
must U.S. SOF be prepared to execute throughout the competitive space and conflict 
continuum, and how can these capabilities be leveraged to enable partner forces in the 
Great Power Competition arena? 
3. Scope 
The primary scope for this research is limited to underwater operations. While the 
broader importance of maritime operations will be touched on, the unique SOF capability 
of utilizing underwater breathing devices as a means to an end to accomplish a tactical task 
is the focus. Furthermore, while the duties and capabilities of all U.S. SOF underwater 
operations capable elements will be discussed in order to build an understanding of the 
status of U.S. SOF underwater forces, the primary focus for recommendations will center 
on U.S. Army Special Forces underwater capability in Great Power Competition. 
D. RESEARCH METHODS 
1. Primary 
The primary research methods for this study will be both qualitative and 
quantitative. A qualitative analysis of the strategy, doctrine, organization, training, and 
equipment of the Italian Naval Commando unit the Decima Mas utilizing Benjamin M. 
5 
Jensen’s theories of institutional mechanisms inherent to innovative organizations.7 A 
quantitative analysis of the Decima’s twenty underwater operations throughout their thirty 
six month campaign during World War II utilizing the Bayesian statistical contingency 
method to measure the success probability will support the qualitative work.8 By these 
methods the necessary fundamentals of successful SOF underwater operations in a peer to 
peer level conflict relevant to Great Power Competition will be identified and measured. 
2. Secondary 
The secondary research method for this study will involve conducting interviews 
of current cadre and leadership at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center Special 
Forces Underwater Operations School, Key West, Florida; the Naval Special Warfare 
Center, Coronado, California; the Marine Combatant Dive Course, Panama City, Florida;  
and the Air Force Combat Diver Course Panama City, Florida. These interviews will 
provide insight into status of the training institutions of U.S. SOF underwater operators, 
their tie-in with the operational force, joint-interoperability, and organizational structure. 
E. CASE STUDY SELECTION 
While there are many examples of maritime, riverine,  and waterborne operations 
in modern Special Operations history since World War II, I have limited case study 
selection by certain criteria to focus the research and provide relevant output for U.S. SOF 
underwater operations potential in the context of competition between great powers. Once 
these criteria are adopted only the operational actions of the Decima MAS in World War II 
serve as a relevant case study with the necessary operational details for analysis. 
1. Criterion I: Underwater Operations 
By this I define Underwater Operations as those operations utilizing a self-
contained underwater breathing apparatus for the operator in order to successfully conduct 
 
7 Benjamin M. Jensen, Forging The Sword: Doctrinal Change In The U.S. Army (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2016), 142. 
8 Dennis V. Lindley, “The Bayesian Analysis of Contingency Tables,” The Annals of Mathematical 
Statistics 35, no. 4 (December 1964): 1. 
6 
the operation or that at least provided a means to conduct a type of operation that would 
not otherwise be possible by other means such as surface swimming, breath hold or “skin 
diving.” This criterion rules out maritime operations by small boat or surface swimmer 
actions prior to the modern era and the invention of underwater breathing devices. It also 
eliminates the numerous surface swimming operations conducted by the U.S. Navy’s 
Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs) during World War II and Korea prior to their 
adoption of SCUBA equipment.9 It also rules out any pure submarine or mini-submarine 
operations that did not require a diver to exit the submerged craft. Finally, the self-
contained criterion rules out any underwater operations utilizing deep-sea diving 
equipment requiring an external gas-supply and tether to a tender surface or submarine 
vessel. Therefore, all U.S. Navy and U.S. Army engineer salvage diving and the deep sea 
diving conducted by Operation IVY BELLS divers from the USS Halibut (SSGN-587) is 
also outside the scope of this study.10 Submarine insertion operations where by the 
operators simply utilized the parent vessel for underwater transit before conducting the 
operation by free ascent swimming to the surface or by have the submarine surface decks-
awash before launching small surface craft such as the type conducted by UDTs from the 
USS Perch (ASSP-313) during the Vietnam conflict is also outside the scope of case study 
criteria.11 
2. Criterion II: Peer Level Adversary 
As this is a study concerned with Great Power Competition this criterion defines 
that an applicable case study is an example of peer or near peer conflict. By peer or near 
peer I define that the player state conducting the underwater operation must have executed 
against a state of equal or greater maritime strength. This makes the cases relevant to the 
current Great Power Competitive paradigm of both Great Power vs. Great Power such as 
the United States and China and a weaker proxy of vs. a Great Power. By this criterion, the 
 
9 Navy Warfare Publication, Naval Special Warfare NWP 3-05, May 2013 (Norfolk, VA: Department 
of the Navy Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2013), 1–2. 
10 John P. Craven, The Silent War: The Cold War Battle Beneath the Sea (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2001), 161. 
11 T.L. Bosiljevac, SEALS: UDT/SEAL Operations in Vietnam (New York: Ivy Books, 1990), 20. 
7 
single Naval Special Warfare limpet mine attack by SEAL Team Two combat swimmers 
against the Presidente Porras during the invasion of Panama, and the more recent Dutch 
underwater sabotage actions against Somali pirates are eliminated. These were each actions 
of a stronger state utilizing advanced technology and underwater capabilities against an 
adversary with little capability to defend against such an attack in the maritime domain.12 
3. Criterion III: Sustained Offensive Operations 
By this criterion I limited the case study selection to sustained operations that are 
offensive in nature and with multiple repeated actions or attempts by the same executing 
unit. Actions executed as a singular event provide little data of operational relevance of 
innovation or counteraction over time. The nature of Great Power Competition being 
defined by long-term sustained rivalry between near equals and their proxies a relevant 
study must include a degree of adaptation and innovation over time to be of any use. This 
eliminated one-offs such as the already mentioned SEAL Team Two limpet attack, and the 
sabotage of Somali pirate vessels. It also eliminated the UDT’s first use of the Aqua-Lung 
to dive on the USS Pledge (AM-277) during the Korean War as this mission was both 
singular and, although executed in a combat zone, it was a recovery operation vs. an 
offensive action.13 Finally, this criterion also eliminated defensive operations such as 
harbor and mine clearance diving conducted by the Royal Navy Clearance Divers (RNCD) 
led by Commander Crabb to counter Decima MAS attacks at Gibraltar.14  
F. CONCLUSION 
The 2018 National Defense Strategy recognized that the United States was 
emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, with America’s competitive military 
 
12 Bradford West, “Frogmen 2.0: Combat Swimmers in the Era of Great Power Competition” 
(Monterey, Naval Postgraduate School, 2019), 3. 
13 Navy Warfare Publication, Naval Special Warfare NWP 3-05, 1–2. 
14 Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani, The Black Prince and the Sea Devils: The Story of Valerio 
Borghese and the Elite Units of the Decima MAS (Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2004), 129. 
8 
advantage eroded.15 This period of atrophy has been followed by a new period of strategic 
competition, most notably with China and Russia. A competitive gray zone that will be 
played out below the threshold of armed conflict, in a space between peace and war.16 
Currently the United States faces China and Russia in a new era of Great Power 
Competition (GPC) reflective of the Cold War of the pre-9/11 era.17 Six years prior to the 
2018 NDS publication’s recognition of both atrophy and strategic competition then 
Chinese president Hu Jintao declared that China’s objective was to become a great 
maritime power.18 Against this backdrop the United States and her allies face Chinese 
naval threats in the  Indo-Pacific region that span the gamut from sovereignty issues over 
land features amidst China’s island building program in the South and East China Seas, to 
the PLA Navy’s increased presence, and China’s use of Maritime militias and fishing 
fleets.19 For almost two-decades U.S. and NATO Special Operations Forces have 
organized, trained and equipped primarily to defeat Violent Extremist Organizations in the 
Middle East in what has been primarily land-based counterinsurgency operations. Yet 
Inter-state strategic competition is now the primary concern of U.S. national security.20 
Given the current global security situation and operational history of the last twenty years 
this study will highlight the current organizational and capability gaps that must be 
addressed in order for U.S. SOF underwater forces to remain relevant and competitive. It 
will also identify the unique opportunities U.S. SOF underwater operations capability 
could provide to enable the greater maritime grand strategy of the United States in the 
coming decades of Great Power Competition. This research will also provide solutions as 
 
15 James Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: 
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge” (United States Government, 2018), 3, 
https://cle.nps.edu/access/content/group/6822f009-30f3-46f5-9320-438777b06f0f/TSDM%2017/2018-
National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
16 Lyle J. Morris et al., “Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone: Response Options for 
Coercive Aggression Below the Threshold of Major War” (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 
2019), 3. 
17 Mattis, “National Defense Strategy 2018,” 1. 
18 Michael McDevitt, “Becoming a Great ‘Maritime Power’: A Chinese Dream” (CNA Analysis & 
Solutions, June 2016), 3. 
19 McDevitt, 6–9. 
20 Mattis, “National Defense Strategy 2018,” 3. 
9 
to how underwater operations can provide SOF options to deter and resist belligerent 
nations through asymmetric capabilities exercised either unilaterally or through partner 
forces. These proposed future requirements will be evaluated against the current SOF 
communities primary formalized underwater operations instructional institutions to 
identify critical capabilities gaps, training shortfalls, and equipment limitations. Finally, 
organizationally innovative solutions that could be adopted to quickly and at low cost will 
be identified to address these gaps and provide a force in readiness for the future 
operational requirements identified in this study. 
  
10 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter I this research highlighted the potential for U.S. SOF combat diving 
operations as an enabling capability in countering the global maritime strategy of adversary 
nations. Chapter I also provided the framework for research design, case study selection, 
assumptions, scope, and limitations of the study. This chapter will highlight the literature 
reviewed to provide a background and foundational theories behind the study. The three 
areas of literature focus are: U.S. Strategy and Doctrine toward Great Power Competition, 
The role of SOF in the Competitive Space, and Special Operations Underwater Operations. 
B. U.S. STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE 
After almost two decades of counterinsurgency and counter-terrorist warfare the 
United States military has begun to refocus on Cold War era style Great Power Competition 
and Conflict namely with China and Russia and their proxies.21 In the 2017 the National 
Security Strategy highlighted the renewed importance of remaining competitive with China 
and Russia, while also signaling a shift from previous U.S. policies based on the idea that 
a prosperous and open China would eventually liberalize her.22 The 2017 National Security 
Strategy called for renewing America’s competitive advantage after a period of strategic 
complacency, and recognized that America’s military force had not kept-pace with 
emerging threats while her adversaries had become adept at targeting America’s 
weaknesses below the threshold of armed conflict within the competitive space.23 The 
2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) recognized the strategic atrophy of American 
military power, the erosion of traditional alliances, and the need for rapid innovation across 
all domains in order to be competitive. This guidance also recognized that strategic 
 
21 Mattis, 1. 
22 Donald Trump, “The National Security Strategy of the United States” (The White House, 
Washington, D.C., December 2017), 25, https://cle.nps.edu/access/content/group/6822f009-30f3-46f5-
9320-438777b06f0f/TSDM%2016/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 
23 Trump, 27. 
12 
competition with China and Russia is the principle priority of the Department of Defense. 
Competition not conflict is the focus of the 2018 NDS, and as such an expansion of the 
competitive space while striving to avoid outright conflict is the focus.24  
C. THE ROLE OF SOF IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION 
Despite the previous two documents’ guidance and focus on GPC in April of 2019 
the revised SOCOM commander’s guidance recognized that while SOF provides the 
United States with unique capabilities, especially within the competitive space below 
conflict, “Countering VEOs that threaten the homeland and U.S. interests remains the top 
priority for USSOCOM.”25 This would seem to indicate that U.S. SOF capabilities serve 
in a secondary capacity to conventional capabilities within the context of Great Power 
Competition. Indeed, recent work on the subject also trends toward the idea of U.S. SOF, 
who has been at the forefront of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, taking a step-down 
to support the conventional force lead in the competition space. In recent work by Brands 
and Nichols on the changing role of SOF they argue that while the Global War on Terror 
or GWOT was the era of SOF a post-GWOT security situation will be something of a “cold 
shower” for SOF and require a change in training and culture for U.S. SOF forces 
accustomed to constant combat deployment cycles in order to adapt to the new roles they 
see SOF supporting within the era of Great Power Competition.26 Namely, while they 
recognize that SOF will play key roles in gathering information and working with strategic 
allies to impose real costs on adversaries in a struggle for regional influence. All the while 
providing postured crisis-response forces; they also make the argument that as deterrence 
becomes increasingly more important SOF will shift into a supporting role as conventional 
forces take the lead in providing strategic deterrence.27 Claire Graja on the other hand 
makes the argument that the role of SOF will not diminish but instead play an even more 
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important role as Irregular Warfare is inherent to modern Great Power Competition, and 
U.S. SOF, namely U.S. Army Special Forces, provides the only force within the 
Department of Defense that trains for and conducts irregular and unconventional warfare 
operations. Therefore, SOF will become a key player as irregular warfare becomes a critical 
aspect to gaining competitive advantage.28  
D. SOF UNDERWATER OPERATIONS 
As the United States leans forward to prepare for the next conflict with other peer-
level nations it is worth looking back to case studies from history to advise the future. This 
is especially true when looking at options for the maritime domain and specifically when 
analyzing the future employment of SOF in the maritime and underwater realm. Case 
studies are especially relevant in that we are experiencing a return to a Cold War style 
emphasis on sea control and within such a context various case studies reveal SOF have 
historically played an important role in littoral and undersea operations.  
Modern SOF history and specifically underwater operations history begins during 
World War II, and no study of the development of underwater operations would be 
complete without examining the operations conducted by the Decima MAS, an elite Italian 
Naval commando unit organized before the war that essentially wrote the book on combat 
diving operations, and is still in existence today. During World War II Italian frogmen 
conducted daring raids on British warships and allied shipping that would lead to some of 
the greatest asymmetric victories in Special Operations history.29 Faced with the full might 
of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean the outnumbered and outgunned Italians turned to 
an innovative special operations leader, Commander Valerio Borghese, and his newly 
created naval commando units to counter the British threat.30 In a classic synergy of 
weapons, technology, and tactics the Italians developed and utilized underwater breathing 
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apparatus, modified torpedoes, advanced mines, and cutting-edge luminescent underwater 
navigation instruments to attack allied ships. The attacks took place not at sea where the 
vessels had maneuver room, but at harbor where they were most vulnerable.31 Borghese’s 
own excellent first hand and well written account Sea Devils provides a primary source 
examining the struggles of the Decima MAS as they fielded new weapons and developed 
new tactics to face the might of one of the world’s most powerful conventional navies. 
Building on Borghese’s original work Naval historians Jack Greene and Allessandro 
Massignani wrote an account of Borghese and his Sea Devils after gaining unprecedented 
access to Italian Naval archives.32  
While these previous are both histories and document the facts of Decima 
operations the first modern analysis of a Decima operation appeared in Admiral William 
McRaven’s thesis work while he was a student at the Naval Postgraduate School that 
became his well-known book Spec Ops. Admiral McRaven examined in-depth a single 
Decima Operation, the manned torpedo attack on British warships at Alexandria, as a case 
study toward his Theory of Special Operations.33 This same operation was also the focus 
of Vincent P. O’Hara’s analysis of the asymmetric advantage of underwater operations in 
attacking capital ships at harbor toward tipping the balance of regional sea control.34 
Certainly the Alexandria Operation is the most famous and well examined of the Decima 
operations. Recent analysis of underwater operations and their strategic effects by Brad 
West, building on Colin Gray’s strategic utilization theory also examined the Alexandria 
attack among two other operations conducted by the Decima in his thesis on the strategic 
potential of Naval Special Warfare ship-attack operations by combat swimmers in the early 
phases of Great Power armed conflict.35 Yet while previous work has examined particular 
Decima operations, no work has done an analysis of the entirety of the twenty underwater 
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operations the Decima carried out during their campaign within the context of Great Power 
Competition. Furthermore, while previous works cite the innovation of the unit in 
developing new underwater equipment, the dynamic leadership of the organization, and 
credit the Decima as the forerunners to the modern techniques of combat diving utilized by 
U.S. Special Operations divers to this day. They fail to apply a method of evaluating the 
various successes and failures of the Decima within the context of their overall campaign 
and naval strategy. They also fail to suggest how lessons-learned from a unit involved in 
full-scale combat operations can be applied to the strategic setting of Great Power 
Competition, a situation short of open-conflict.  
As stated previously the Cold War is a highly relevant period to examine for 
military strategist now looking forward to options within Great Power Competition. The 
Cold War environment also provided a setting for a high degree of innovation and 
experimentation in undersea warfare due to the nature of the Soviet naval threat and the 
need for clandestine and covert action. Fortunately, some of the most highly classified 
undersea operations of the Cold War are now available for examination. The most famous 
and well documented of these operations was codenamed IVY BELLS and well 
documented in Blind Man’s Bluff. Operation IVY BELLS delivered one of the greatest 
intelligence coups ever carried out against Soviet naval forces. The program itself is a 
lesson in innovation and compartmentalization of concurrent efforts. During these missions 
U.S. Navy Divers pioneered deep sea diving techniques while specially modified nuclear 
submarines delivered them to the seabed off the east coast of Russia in the Sea of Okhotsk. 
There they placed recording devices that taped the Soviet Navy’s underwater cables, 
enabling U.S. naval intelligence to monitor the status and location of Soviet submarines 
throughout the pacific for years. The current body of work on this operation focuses on the 
technology required and the integration of the specially modified submarines required for 
the missions.36 Yet the success of IVY BELLS serves as an example of the clandestine 
advantage of underwater operations in intelligence gathering within the competitive space. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Currently the Unites States faces a new era of strategic competition with primarily 
China and Russia, a competitive arena that will involve struggle for control of the worlds 
maritime domain.37 Recent work has highlighted the importance of the maritime domain 
within China’s global strategy and therefore the potential importance of underwater 
operations as a critical SOF capability to enable control of the sea by countering anti-access 
and area-denial weapons.38 Yet while the United States has been focused on conducting 
counter-insurgency operations for nearly two decades U.S. Special Operations underwater 
capability and innovation has atrophied. Additionally, while strategic planners and policy 
makers have recently recognized the role that increased maritime dominance will play in 
the competitive realm, it has been primarily platform and technology focused.39 There is 
very little to no research being conducted into the status and capability of U.S. SOF 
underwater units and if they are prepared to conduct missions like the ones carried out 
during World War II and the Cold War. Of even further significant absence, despite the 
recent recognition of the importance of irregular and unconventional warfare within Great 
Power Competition, is any examination of the role SOF underwater capability could play 
in irregular warfare. While the current work and study available seeks to exemplify the 
technology required to conduct unilateral operations, it fails to address critical questions of 
SOF indirect underwater capability such as: How U.S. SOF could leverage underwater 
operations equipment and expertise through partner or surrogate forces? How SOF 
underwater capability could augment conventional U.S. and allied forces? Finally, what is 
the role if any of SOF underwater capability as an asymmetric deterrent against U.S. 
adversaries within the context of Great Power Competition?4041 
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III. DECIMA MAS ORGANIZATIONAL CASE STUDY 
“I consider history to be impartially written for future generations: from the 
knowledge of their predecessors’ mistakes, they should learn not to commit 
them again.” — Prince Junio Valerio Borghese42 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter identified areas where gaps exist in the theory and application 
of potential application of SOF underwater operations capability to support a grand 
maritime strategy during an era of Great Power Competition. This chapter will introduce 
the methods utilized to conduct an organization analysis of the Decima MAS while they 
conducted underwater operations during World War II. An overview of the strategic 
context will provide the background for the creation of the unit, while their organizational 
structure will be compared to Benjamin Jensen’s theories of Incubators and Advocacy 
Groups in achieving innovative success.43 
B. STRATEGIC CONTEXT: ITALY AND GREAT BRITAIN 
 Before an analysis of the Decima Mas operations can be accomplished an 
understanding of the strategic context and background that led to the creation of the 
organization must be reviewed. According to Borghese the true beginning of the Decima 
Mas was on the 2nd Oct 1935, during the inter-war period. During this period Italian Naval 
planners faced with peer-level Great Power Competition between the Italian and British 
navies recognized that if Italy were to face the power of the British fleet in a future war in 
the Mediterranean any chance of success for the Italy could be immediately discounted 
from the start of hostilities. While the Italian navy possessed highly capable surface vessels, 
submarines, and the officers and crews to man them, the disproportionate advantage would 
go to Britain. The Royal Naval over-matched the Italian Navy both on the high seas and in 
the Naval air arm. Great Britain also had the advantage in industrial strength and capability 
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over Italy. Finally, while the Italian Navy operated from their home country Britain enjoyed 
forward basing such as at Gibraltar to operate in the Mediterranean. Given this possible 
war-time scenario, Borghese described the pre-war outlook as such: Italy an island, 
bordered on each side by the sea and mountains to the north. They would be under siege, 
isolated on the peninsula and starved out by the British blockade.44 This early strategic 
outlook reflects an emphasis on the naval theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, particularly 
his ideas of the three pillars of sea power: shipping, both merchant and capital ships, 
economic and industrial might, and forward naval bases. in gaining naval superiority.45  
C. A SECRET WEAPON  
1. Early Beginnings 
Within this pre-war competitive space between Italy and Great Britain Italian naval 
planners theorized that perhaps a secret capability could be developed to offset the British 
advantage. Such a capability would have to be utilized: 1) Very early in the initial phases 
of any war. and 2) On a massive scale through multiple simultaneous strikes in varied 
locations. By this approach Italy could gain the advantage over Britain. In order to achieve 
these effects the capability would require both absolute secrecy and synchronization to 
have the greatest effect in maximizing surprise and evading enemy countermeasures.46 
Two sub-lieutenants, Teseo Tesei and Elios Toschi, both members of the Flotilla based at 
La Spezia had been examining exactly this problem set for years. Inspired by the actions 
of Lieutenant Raffaele Paolucci, a surgeon and Major Raffaele Rossetti, a Naval Engineer, 
who had sunk the Viribius Unitis at the mouth of the Pola harbor in November of 1918.47 
They had done so by riding astride an eight-meter long torpedo running on compressed air 
to penetrate the harbor at Pola after being released from a Motoscafi Anti Sommergibili 
(antisubmarine motorboat) or MAS, one kilometer outside the defenses. This early effort 
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had been crude, the pilots controlled the speed of the torpedo by regulating the amount of 
air being released in a manner akin to slowly letting air out of a SCUBA cylinder. Steering 
the torpedo left and right was ponderous and only accomplished with their bodies as the 
device did not have controls or moveable control surfaces. Even given these limitations 
they were able to penetrate the seven layers of harbor defense and fix their detachable 
charges to the side of the Viribius Unitis before being captured. At dawn on the 1st of 
November muffled explosions were heard and the Viribius Unitis promptly capsized.48  
2. The Birth of the Decima MAS 
It was with this national and naval history as inspiration, and with the Mahanian 
struggle for sea control in mind that Lieutenants Tesei and Toschi began work on a new 
“manned torpedo” the Siluro a Lenta Corsa (slow torpedo) or SLC.49 Four other men 
joined their ranks and formed the nucleus of the Decima Mas (Tenth Light Flotilla) or 
Decima in 1936. The small unit quickly organized into Research and Construction, 
Training, and Operational Employment departments with respective responsibilities.50 
Despite these humble beginnings elements of this early organizational model would remain 
in place throughout the duration of Decima operations during World War II and will be 
examined further as a critical element of future success. 
3. Institutional Challenges 
As is often the case for many new and innovative weapons promising to rebalance 
the fight, there were true believers on both sides. On the one side, given early 
demonstrations and the perceived effectiveness and stealth of the weapon, supporters 
advocated that surface fleets would now be obsolete. While others maintained the more 
traditional notion that capital ships of the line armed with guns would remain the supreme 
factor in naval power.51 Early resistance to the new ideas of employment for the weapon 
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was organizational as well as operational and generated by the deep-seated bureaucracy 
within the Naval tradition. Besides resistance to the unconventional nature of the weapon 
itself, the question of allowing two engineers who had developed the craft to also be its 
pilots was considered absurd. An SLC was considered a naval craft to be commanded or 
piloted and command and piloting was reserved for officers of the line, deck officers, not 
engineers.52 Given the internal bureaucratic friction, the institutional distrust, a lack of a 
solid concept of employment for the weapon or agreement of what its true potential was, 
the fledgling unit was denied adequate resources and by 1936 as the war in Africa 
terminated the ideas were shelved and the men reassigned until 1938.53 Borghese reflects 
that this two-year setback denied the Italian Navy the opportunity to deliver the “early 
blow” originally envisioned to have the greatest effect against the British fleet.  
4. First Operational Tests 
It was only once war in Europe was imminent that there was a renewed interest in 
further developing the weapon and training the operators so that by 1940 the first 
operational demonstration could be achieved.54 Although the original manned torpedo 
attack was launched from a surface craft, it was envisioned that these new SLCs would be 
air-mobile and deploy from a float plane landed at sea near the target. This proved 
unfeasible in testing and it was decided that they would be submarine carried and 
launched.55 With Borghese in command, the first operational test of three SLCs launched 
from the submarine Ametista was conducted in the Gulf of La Spezia in 1940. During the 
exercise one vehicle and crew was successful in placing a dummy charge on their target.56  
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D. ORGANIZATION, SELECTION, AND TRAINING 
1. Organization 
a. The Underwater Division 
Although the Decima Mas contained both surface and underwater groups, it is the 
activities of the underwater group that this study is concerned with. In a reflection of the 
original nucleus of the force the underwater group contained within its organization 
elements for Planning, Research and Development of Materials, and Training. Of special 
note is the inclusion of the parent transport submarines within the underwater group 
(Borghese was initially dual-hatted as the commander of the underwater group and of the 
submarine Scire) this provided organic dedicated submarine assets available during all 
phases of training, planning and operations. The underwater division consisted of the 
“pioneer” diver training center, piloted torpedo training center, the transport submarines, 
and the sabotage groups.57  
b. Research and Development 
In a fusion of military organization and private industry that was ahead of its time 
Commander Belloni was put in charge of the sub aquatic research center to study “technical 
problems of human life underwater” and authorized to correspond directly with private 
firms for technological innovation. As an example, close collaboration with Pirelli led to 
the development of both the breathing devices and rubber dry suits worn by the operators.58 
(Although the rubber dry suits were manufactured by Pirelli they are still often referenced 
in the literature as the “Belloni suits” after the commanding officer who was instrumental 
in their development.) Borghese notes the unique organizational structure of the Decima’s 
underwater division was necessary for, “A fusion between professional and civilian staff 
and co-operation between medical, scientific, inventive, engineering, maritime and 
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industrial producers which is indispensable in achieving maximum results in military 
effort.”59  
c. Decentralized Command 
In addition to selection, training, and research and development, the Decima 
enjoyed a unique status for operational planning as well. The Italian Naval leadership had 
begun to realize, through Borghese’s and others’ advocacy, the potential of the new weapon 
and in a departure from conventional naval operations gave the Decima and its leadership 
a free hand to plan operations.60 In coordination with the rapid technological innovation 
capability, this decentralization of control stimulated the initiative of the every individual 
and shortened the time an idea could be tested, trained on, and executed while maintaining 
a form of compartmentalization from the greater force and therefore secrecy (a constant 
problem within the Italian Navy).61 This organizational agility would prove valuable in the 
future for the reorganization, rebuilding, and training of new operators and new leadership 
and the adoption of revised technology and tactics after failures and sustaining losses such 
as they would see at Malta.62 Borghese relates that this organizational construct, and 
autonomy enabled a culture within the Decima that was unique from the traditional naval 
construct. The officers and men were united by a “culture of excellence.” The Decima 
officers lead by example rather than through orders. While officers and enlisted competed 
in a friendly rivalry of skill and courage.63 
2. Selection and Training 
a. SLC Pilots 
Selection and training of the men that would pilot the SLCs required what Borghese 
described as a “strict weeding out process,” with an emphasis on the stamina required for 
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sustained operations in the hazardous environment of the sea. Ultimately each man had to 
inspire confidence in his physical and mental strength, before an interview with the 
Commander who had the last word on if he would be allowed into the organization.64 
Borghese when speaking of the type of cool-headed and resilient nature one must be to 
employ the “insidious weapon” of the torpedo.65 In order to expand the pool of likely 
recruits with the necessary temperament for SLC piloting selection was widened to the 
entire navy to allow the best candidates to apply without restriction.66 After initial training 
of underwater breathing equipment or “pioneer school,” the candidates transitioned to 
manned-torpedo or SLC training. The SLCs were not an intuitive craft to pilot and as such 
experience had taught them that a good torpedo pilot needed at least a year of training to 
become skilled enough to attempt a harbor penetration and ship-attack.67 The SLC training 
pipeline consisted of  four phases. In phase one the future SLC pilots learned how to 
maneuver their SLCs in a simulated approach to an enemy harbor. In phase two they 
learned how to lock-out or exit the transport submarine. Phase three consisted of learning 
the techniques for breaching underwater obstacles protecting the harbors. In phase four 
they learned to detach the warheads of their SLCs and attach them to enemy ships.68 Once 
qualified sustainment training consisted of twice a week conducting a night-time launch 
from a parent submarine or surface vessel for a full-mission profile simulated attack against 
moored ships at harbor.69 During the training the Decima devised a safety standard for 
training still in use today by SOF diving organizations. A Diving Supervisor and Dive 
Medical Technician or Diving Medical Officer was stationed topside in a safety vessel 
accompanying every training dive. The Decima had learned that due to the likelihood of 
equipment failures and the nature of the physiological stresses of oxygen diving and cold 
water on the men that this was the surest way to maintain safety and medical support 
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standards in a training environment.70 Figure 1 is a sketch depicting a typical SLC operator, 
of note is the bulky dry suit and long duration oxygen rebreather. 
 
Figure 1. SLC Pilot71 
b. Gamma Group 
During their operational employment, the Decima expanded their organization. In 
addition to the original SLC pilots the Decima formed a new group the “Gamma Group” 
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or assault swimmers. Based on their experiences trying to penetrate the harbor at Gibraltar 
while a significant amount of allied shipping remained at anchor in the open and 
unprotected roadstead of the Bay of Algeciras, a new tactic had emerged. SLCs, with their 
large 300 kilogram warhead would continue to be tasked to attack warships (the larger 
charge deemed necessary to breach armored hulls), while Gamma men would swim armed 
with multiple smaller charges carried around their waists capable of breaching the lighter 
steamer hulls.72 In contrast to the SLC training pipeline, selection and training of Gamma 
men emphasized swimming and navigation. Selection of volunteers for this service 
required men who were excellent swimmers and had “water worthiness.” The list of the 
men in the Italian Swimmers League provided an initial means to recruit the best natural 
swimmers from civilian life, and the other branches of service. Recruiting for the Gamma 
Group was a true joint endeavor that emphasized the individual aptitude of the man instead 
of what service he was in. As such most of the swimmers who filled the ranks of the 
Gamma Group came from the Army where they had already been recruited for their athletic 
prowess. This joint recruitment effort led to extremely close collaboration of the Decima 
with the other branches of the service, a first for the Italian Armed Forces.73 This new 
approach to required new training techniques and led to new equipment requirements. The 
Gamma Group were the first to utilize rubber swim fins, submersible wrist mounted 
compass, watch, and depth gauge. A basic combination still in use by combat swimmers 
today. The Gamma training pipeline utilized the Pioneer schools existing facilities because 
of the swimming pool. This was necessary for refining the swimming technique required 
for Gamma operations. The Pioneer school also provided the necessary logistical support 
for the rebreather training of the Gamma swimmers.74 Figure 2 is a sketch depicting a 
typical Gamma swimmer, note the streamlined Pirelli rubber suit, the camouflaged 
headdress, shorter duration rebreather, mines carried around the waist, and the rubber swim 
fins, in contrast to the SLC operator. 
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Figure 2. Gamma Swimmer75 
E. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND EQUIPMENT 
1. SLCs 
From the beginning the Decima was a highly technical and innovative organization. 
The original reason for the creation of a new arm of the Italian Navy in the first place 
stemmed from the creation of the manned torpedo or SLC. Originally a modified torpedo, 
in its final iteration it was a purpose built and sophisticated craft. It carried two men sitting 
astride in tandem wearing rubber dry suits and pure oxygen rebreathers manufactured by 
Pirelli that could provide six hours of submerged time.76 The SLC had a maximum speed 
of 2.5 mph., a max depth of 30 meters, (often exceeded during their operations), and a max 
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range of ten miles. Its batteries provided electric power, and the pilot console had a depth 
gauge, compass, and voltmeter. The nose of the craft was a detachable 300 kg explosive 
charge that would be clamped to a line running from the bilge keels. The men carried tools 
onboard for breaching harbor defenses such as net lifters, net-cutters, and scissors.77  
Technological adaptation and development of the SLCs was continuous. The 
Decima used the summer months, with their long days and short nights that were not good 
for operations, to overhaul and R&D the SLCs based on the lessons learned and feedback 
from the operators during training and operations. The Decima worked closely with private 
industry directly to speed the process of updating the SLCs and their transport 
submarines.78 Initially the 30-meter depth limitation of the SLCs limited the depth 
capability of the transport submarines. The invention of steel cylinders to house the SLCs 
on the deck of the support submarines while in transit solved this issue and was later copied 
by other Navies.79 
2. Gamma Group 
Gamma Operators wore a lighter version of the Pirelli rubber dry suit nicknamed 
the “The Belloni.” They were also equipped with a smaller lighter version of the pure 
oxygen rebreathers that utilized counter-lung breathing bags and soda-lime canisters good 
for only thirty minutes compared to the six hours of the SLC versions.80 In contrast to the 
SLC pilots Gamma men swam on the surface to their targets before submerging for a short 
duration on final approach to set their charges before swimming away from their target on 
the surface. The were equipped with rubber swim fins to assist their swimming technique. 
To camouflage on the surface they blacked out their faces and wore a head net of flotsam 
and seaweed.81  
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The original explosive device developed for Gamma swimmers was nicknamed the 
“leech” mine. It was a 2 kg mine that utilized air suction to attach to the hull of a ship. Each 
Gamma swimmer carried four to five mines around the waist. A second larger version was 
developed dubbed the “bug.” It was a 3 kg shaped charge, with an inflatable ring and 
cartridge that would ensure it remained at the bottom of the hull below the bilge keels. Both 
types of mines were equipped with a mechanical time fuse.82 The final most advanced 
version of the Gamma weapons was the “limpet.” A dramatic improvement over the bug, 
it was a truly innovative device. It contained a 4.5 kg high explosive shaped charge secured 
to the bilge keel by clamps. Rather than a mechanical timer activated by the diver it utilized 
a time and space fuse that activated the timer by propeller once it was turning revolutions 
for 5 mph. This gave the dual advantage of sinking a target vessel at sea in deeper water 
where it could not be salvaged and in that it left the enemy to believe their vessel had been 
torpedoed and was therefore non-attributable to Gamma swimmer activity.83  
F. ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
1. Foundational Theory 
Utilizing Benjamin Jensen’s theory of how doctrinal change occurred in the U.S. 
Army over a thirty-year period we can evaluate the organizational structure and culture of 
the Decima to reveal certain parallels inherent to the early structure of the Decima 
underwater division and what Jensen identifies as necessary for an organization to 
innovate. In Jensen’s study he highlighted the unique role knowledge networks played in 
allowing new ideas to form and spread in an otherwise rigid bureaucracy. The bureaucracy 
he examined, the U.S. Army, was by its nature resistant to change in the same manner that 
the Italian Navy was also resistant to the idea of a new subversive and unconventional 
approach to naval warfare. Jensen’s case study revealed two institutional mechanisms that 
enabled innovation despite the overarching bureaucracy. He labelled these: Incubators and 
Advocacy Networks.84  
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a. Incubators 
According to Jensen, “Incubators, informal subunits established outside the 
hierarchy, provided a safe space where officers could escape the iron cage of 
bureaucracy.”85 Within these “safe spaces” officers could form new ideas and explore 
alternative methods of victory through critical analysis and organizational speculation. An 
Incubator is a forum for the sharing of ideas of how to fight and win in current and future 
conflicts.86 Broken down Jensen identified three properties common to Incubators: 
∑ Officers frame problems through careful study and analysis. 
∑ Problem-driven simulation is used to refine new concepts. 
∑ Size matters, small is beautiful. The most innovative work and imaginative 
thinking is done by small cohorts.87 
b. Advocacy Networks 
Jensen defines Advocacy Networks as the pathways that provide the connective 
tissue between Incubators and the greater community. New ideas formed within Incubators 
flow out through these “contagion vectors” that infect others with new ideas.88 Jensen 
further defined two key fundamentals for Advocacy Networks to be effective: 
∑ Advocacy Networks require senior leadership protection. Without their 
stamp of approval, change is impossible in a hierarchical organization.89 
∑ The brokerage of new ideas is critical to infection pathways.90 
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2. Theory Applied 
Building on Jensen’s theory of the relationship between Incubators, Advocacy 
Networks, and Senior Leadership we can create an organizational model of Incubators and 
Sub-Incubators. That is, small groups within an organization that is already an Incubator 
inside the greater bureaucracy. With this sub-division we can further divide into internal 
and external Advocacy Networks. Internal Advocacy Networks provide pathways for ideas 
to flow between the Sub-Incubators but within the confines of the Incubator. In the same 
manner that Senior leadership was identified by Jensen as required for the protection of 
Advocacy Networks, leadership within the Incubator can provide protection or Internal 
Support of the Internal Advocacy Networks linking the Sub-Incubators. Internal 
Leadership also serves the dual function of vectoring External Lines of Advocacy to 
outside Senior Leadership or Supporters to continually influence their support of the 
Incubator within the Greater Organization itself. Figure 1 provides a possible graphic 
representation of this organization. 
 
Figure 3. Incubator and Advocacy Networks Model 
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3. Jensen’s Theory and the Decima MAS 
We can now apply this model to the organization of the Decima MAS Underwater 
Division. As we have already seen the Decima organized very early into small groups for 
operational planning, research and development, and training.91 Each of these departments 
served as Sub-Incubators for new ideas within the primary Incubator of the Underwater 
Division. Furthermore because of the nature of the constant technical development of the 
diving equipment, the manned torpedoes, and the various munitions employed by the 
Gamma swimmers a constant feedback loop between the small groups served as Internal 
Advocacy Networks between the Sub-Incubators within the Incubator.  
Meanwhile, Senior leadership such as Commander Borghese himself provided a 
high degree of approval for the constant flow of information along the Advocacy Networks 
between the Sub-Incubators. Borghese also served in the critical position of vectoring 
outside support for the Decima through frequent engagement with Italian Naval leadership 
and even King Victor Emmanuel III.92  
Figure 4 represents the Organization model applied to the Decima MAS. Arrows 
represent the brokerage of new ideas along Advocacy Networks between the Incubators 
and the Support of Senior Leadership toward those Advocacy Networks. Within the 
Incubator are the Sub-Incubators of the Operations, Training, and Research & 
Development Departments. Internal Command and Control provides both Senior 
Leadership approval of the Advocacy Network linking the Divisions and serves as a fourth 
Sub-Incubator of ideas resulting in an extremely “flat” organization with no information 
“stovepipes.” 
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Figure 4. Model Applied to Decima Organizational Structure 
G. CONCLUSION 
Benjamin Jensen’s theories serve well as a foundation for a model of the structure 
of the Decima underwater division. The Decima organization contained the elements 
Jensen identified as necessary for an organization to be capable of innovation.93 Namely 
the Decima organization exemplified the three properties common to Incubators. The three 
properties rewritten for the specific organization: 
∑ Decima Operators framed their problem set through careful study and 
analysis at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels. 
∑ Realistic full-mission profile training, and operational feedback was used 
to refine new concepts. 
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∑ The Decima organized their Training, Research & Development, and 
Operational Planning divisions into small cohorts to encourage the most 
innovative work and imaginative thinking. 
While new ideas may be formed within an Incubator, they require Advocacy 
Networks in order to be adopted and for the organization to innovate.94 The Decima also 
contained Jensen’s fundamentals of Advocacy Networks within their organizational 
structure as well. If the fundamental statements are rewritten: 
∑ Decima leadership provided the necessary senior level top-down support 
to encourage change.  
∑ New ideas were shared and encouraged from all levels of the organization 
and across the separate Divisions. 
The Decima MAS was an extremely innovative organization, that was capable of 
rapidly revising strategy, doctrine, tactics, and the training to support them. They were also 
able to field cutting edge equipment innovations at an extremely rapid pace to support 
changes in operational employment. This was no small feat for a relatively small 
organization existing within the structure of the larger conventional Italian Navy or what 
Jensen labelled the “Iron Cage of Bureaucracy.”95 Yet the key to their ability to so rapidly 
shift their strategy and adopt new weapons and tactics was no accident. From the start the 
Decima was organized to be successful at encouraging and adopting innovative ideas. 
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IV. DECIMA MAS OPERATIONS CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter examined the strategic context of the formation of the Decima 
MAS and the construction of the SLC as a weapon to offset Royal Navy overmatch in the 
Mediterranean. Chapter three also compared the organizational structure of the Decima 
MAS underwater division to Benjamin Jensen’s theories on the elements necessary for a 
military organization to innovate. Previous work on Decima MAS operations have focused 
on the strategic effects of Decima ship-attack operations.96 To focus this research on 
relevant lessons-learned a comparative analysis of each operation and the elements that led 
to success will be done. As a function of this comparative analysis, “success” must be 
defined for each operation. The traditional method in previous work is to label those 
Decima operations that resulted in a successful ship attack as a success. While this binary 
method is useful when the focus is on the effects of the operation rather than the elements 
of the operation itself if fails to take into consideration the complexity of the current 
geopolitical situation when compared to the environment of full-scale conflict during 
World War II. 
B. EARLY FAILURES AND SETBACKS 
1. Submarine Iride SLC Attempt against Alexandria 25–26 August 1940 
In the Decima’s first attempt the submarine Iride departed La Spezia for the Gulf 
of Bomba where she was scheduled to make a daylight transfer of four SLCs and their 
operators from the torpedo boat Calipso before continuing on to Alexandria.97 During the 
transfer they were attacked by British torpedo planes. This resulted in the loss of Iride and 
the support ship Monte Gargano. The SLCs were recovered later by their operators who 
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had survived the sinking of the Iride only because they were outside the submarine 
facilitating the SLC transfer when she was attacked.98 
Analysis – Failure: Eager to utilize the SLCs as an early decisive option the 
Decima rushed this operation before their equipment was fully ready. The SLCs could not 
exceed a depth of 30 m when transiting on the back of a host submarine. This depth 
limitation in transit combined with a desire to keep the SLC operators fresh was the 
deciding factor that led to the fateful transfer of the SLCs to the Iride at the Gulf of Bomba. 
Poor planning led to a cluster of vessels on the surface in shallow and isolated waters off 
the Gulf of Bomba, with no friendly air cover. Unknown to the Italians the flotilla was 
compromised early when a British submarine spotted the Calipso in transit and notified the 
Royal Air Force (RAF) who in turn passed the information to a Swordfish torpedo bomber 
group stationed on the HMS Eagle.99 The limitations imposed by the depth limitations of 
the SLCs in transit astride a parent submarine would lead to the development of dry 
enclosures to house the SLCs in transit and allow the transport submarine its full 
operational depth capability during transit and insertion.100 
2. Submarine Gondar SLC Attempt against Alexandria 29 September 
1940  
 A month after the failed attempt by the Iride a second attempt was made to 
attack Alexandria. On the night of 29 September, the submarine Gondar with  three SLCs 
and six operators arrived off Alexandria. Once surfaced and about to begin the launch of 
the SLCs she received radio traffic that the British fleet had departed the harbor of 
Alexandria. She was then caught on the surface by allied anti-submarine forces. The 
Gondar crash-dove to evade but was pursued and depth charged by three surface vessels 
for twelve hours until she was forced to the surface. The crew scuttled the ship, resulting 
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in the loss of the Gondar, the three SLCs she carried, and the capture of her entire surviving 
crew by the British.101 
3. Submarine Scire SLC Attempt against Gibraltar 29 September 1940 – 
Abort 
The Scire departed La Spezia for an attack on the British at Gibraltar synchronized 
with the Gondar against Alexandria. On the same day the Gondar surfaced and received 
word the British had departed the Scire surfaced outside the straits of Gibraltar and received 
the same message concerning the British warships at Gibraltar, she aborted her attempt and 
returned to La Spezia.102 
Analysis: Stunned by the sudden loss of the Iride and the complete failure of their 
first attempt the two synchronized operations of the Gondar and Scire was a follow-up 
attack with the hopes of securing an early decisive blow with the new weapon. The 
limitations of Italian Naval Intelligence and communications with a submarine in-transit 
meant that the message to abort and return to Tobruk came too late and the Gondar was 
already off Alexandria and at risk of compromise. In a manner similar to the early detection 
of the Calipso as she transited to the Gulf of Bomba the Italians were unaware that the 
Gondar was compromised by sonar sweeps from the Australian destroyer HMAS Stuart 
while she was on the surface receiving messages and snorkeling.103 These attacks are 
reflective of the original strategy and concept of employment of the SLCs: To attack the 
enemy’s capital ships, in their forward operating harbors, early in the campaign, and in a 
synchronized manner at multiple locations. Following these failures and an aborted attempt 
Italian Naval planners’ original hopes for a quick success will begin to be reevaluated. The 
great loss of equipment, manpower, and training time in rapid succession would lay the 
groundwork for a revision of strategy, doctrine, and tactics.104 
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4. Submarine Scire SLC attack at Gibraltar 30 October 1940 – Failure 
After departing La Spezia with three SLCs and their operators onboard, the Scire 
successfully passed the straits of Gibraltar and penetrated the Bay of Algeciras by hugging 
the Spanish coast and moving slowly until she was two miles from Gibraltar harbor and 
only three-hundred meters offshore at the mouth of the Guadaranche river.105 The three 
SLCs are launched but each suffer various mechanical failures of their craft’s navigation 
and control equipment that forced them to make their approach run on the surface. They 
are compromised by Anti-Submarine patrols surrounding Gibraltar, pursued and depth 
charged. Two SLC crews abort their attempts after damage to their craft and breathing 
devices; they scuttle their SLCs and breathing rigs and escape to Spain to link-up with 
agents for extraction.106 One SLC pilot is successful in penetrating the harbor defense but 
his SLC malfunctioned on final attack approach and he placed his charge on the bottom 
near the battleship HMS Barham, which had no effect. He was then compromised on the 
surface and taken into custody.107 
Analysis: Despite earlier failures, Borghese, who was now in command of the 
Scire, states in his account that to be able to strike at the enemy when they are within their 
safe harbor became the motivating factor behind what he cites as the first truly coordinated 
attempt.108 This is also the first of many attempts at Gibraltar and although due in large 
part to the skill of the Scire’s crew it validates the theory that a submarine can successfully 
penetrate the Bay of Algeciras to insert SLCs.109 Of note for future operations is the 
proximity of the Scire’s release point of the SLCs to the Spanish coastline, and the first 
successful employment of clandestine networks in Spain to extract the SLC operators. As 
the doctrine and tactics of the Decima evolve these details will become more relevant in 
that once released from the host submarine the operators can no longer return to or be 
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supported by it as it begins its own exfiltration.110 The lessons learned for the Decima is 
that heroic effort and physical exertion is not enough to overcome equipment failures and 
the stiff resistance of British ASW patrols. The effects of this operation also alerted the 
enemy to a new type of threat that was no longer a secret, after one of the scuttled SLCs 
washed ashore, and would lead to greater security and countermeasures being adopted.111 
Borghese considered the attack valuable experience for the submarine crew and SLC 
operators and a psychological success in that the enemy now had a sense of insecurity, 
especially among the merchant crews not normally anchored in the harbor proper. Finally, 
although increased countermeasures would make any further attempts at Gibraltar more 
difficult he believed the enormous amount of energy expended by the British to attempt to 
counter the threat in harbor previously believed safe was a victory for the Decima as 
well.112 
5. Submarine Scire SLC Attack against Gibraltar 26 May 1941 – Failure 
By May of 1941, the best attempt to eliminate the equipment shortfalls that had led 
to certain failures during the October 1940 attack at Gibraltar had been made and the SLC 
operators’ training had been updated. To eliminate the ill effects of the long underwater 
transit onboard the Scire from La Spezia to Gibraltar the SLC operators were infiltrated by 
air into Spain before being transferred by Naval Intelligence assets to the port of Cadiz to 
be put aboard the Italian tanker Fulgor which had remained at harbor at Cadiz since the 
start of the war. In the meantime the Scire made the transit from La Spezia and came 
alongside the Fulgor to make the transfer of men and equipment before setting course to 
infiltrate Algeciras Bay.113 The rendezvous with the Fulgor also permitted Borghese to 
receive an intelligence update on the status of enemy vessels in the harbor at Gibraltar 
before getting underway. Once on station as before at the mouth of the Guadaranque River 
Borghese received the message, “Harbor is empty, all vessels having left during the 
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evening; operators will have to attack steamers in the roadstead.”114 At launch one of the 
three SLCs is completely inoperable and its warhead is taken in tow and the operators 
cross-loaded to the other two SLCs. Both remaining SLCs are forced to navigate on the 
surface by visual aid due to inoperable compasses. When attempting to place their 
respective charges both SLCs suffer from buoyancy issues and the men overexert 
themselves to the point of unconsciousness before abandoning their attempts.115 Each of 
the men evade enemy surface patrols during their surface swim back across the bay to 
Spain to link up with the assets awaiting to extract them.116 
Analysis: Although the attack was a complete failure, and the SLCs are still 
plagued by equipment malfunctions, with one craft inoperable at the start and the other two 
with inoperable navigation equipment before becoming negatively buoyant and crash 
diving to the bottom during charge placement, this exercised a critical capability for future 
operations. The highlight of the operation was the testing and vetting of the new mechanism 
for infiltrating the operators into Spain and transferring them from the airport to the Fulgor 
and back with the help of local agents. This mechanism had operated flawlessly and had 
not aroused the suspicion of British Intelligence networks.117 This was the first use of 
cover names and identities by Decima operators and the first use of a forward location, in 
the form of the stationary Fulgor, codenamed Base C, to stage an attack.118 
6. Sloop Diana SLC Attack at Malta 26 July 1941 – Failure  
The next attempt, this time against Malta would be the worst failure of the Decima 
in the war. In their first combined approach the SLCs were not utilized as originally 
intended to deliver the decisive blow to enemy shipping. Instead the SLCs were assigned 
the supporting task of using their charges to breach the lines of harbor defenses to allow 
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the MAS surface craft to penetrate with their explosive payloads delivering the decisive 
blow. The sloop Diana was utilized as a support vessel for the transit to minimize risk to 
the MAS boats.119 Caught on the surface in the early hours of daylight the flotilla came 
under furious attack from British aviation and the garrison artillery. The results were 
devastating, a complete failure and 15 men dead, 18 taken prisoner, the loss of one large 
motorboat, eight smaller E type boats, the two SLCs, two Italian aircraft who arrived in 
support, and the towing vehicle for the MAS and SLCs.120 
Analysis: Following the repeated failures of the SLCs in the previous operations 
and the losses of submarines, equipment, and men what seems a desperate attempt to 
incorporate the SLCs into a combined assault resulted in the worst failure in a single 
operation for the Decima. The operation was compromised from the start. Unbeknownst to 
the Italians allied forces were prepared for an attack due to three indicators: British ULTRA 
operations had intercepted transmissions that an attack on Malta was imminent, the sloop 
Diana and the rest of the flotilla was detected by radar very early during final approach, 
finally the sound of the engines of the surface craft could be heard by the defenders for 
some time.121 The fatal lessons at Malta would reinforce that the underwater capability of 
the SLCs had always been intended as a surreptitious weapon and not one designed to 
assault a hardened and alert enemy position. 
C. FIRST SUCCESS WITH THE NEW WEAPON
1. Submarine Scire SLC Attack against Gibraltar Sep 20–21 1941 –
Success 
One year after the breakout of hostilities, after many painful lessons learned the 
men of the Decima were ready for their first success with the SLCs. After again utilizing 
the now vetted mechanisms to infiltrate and transfer the operators from the Fulgor to the 
Scire at Cadiz the Scire came to rest at her now familiar location on the bottom of the 
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Algeciras at the mouth of the Guadaranque River on the evening of the 20th September. 
After receiving a telegram from the naval staff confirming the presence of British warships 
at Gibraltar Borghese tasked two SLCs to attack the Nelson class battleship, and the third 
SLC to attack the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal at anchorage.122 The three SLCs were 
launched without issues and made their approach on the surface in rough winds and seas. 
Each SLC had to evade active British ASW patrols as they made the transit across the Bay 
of Algeciras. As a result of the British patrols and countermeasures only one SLC 
penetrated the harbor while the other two made for the rows of steamers at anchor in the 
unprotected roadstead. All three SLC pilots chose targets of opportunity given the stiff 
resistance rather than their original assigned targets. After placing their charges and 
evading back to the Spanish coast they scuttled their craft and linked up at the prearranged 
location with their clandestine asset for exfiltration.123 The following morning violent 
explosions rocked the bay and harbor at Gibraltar. Shortly after the tanker Fiona Shells and 
the merchant steamer Durham sank in the roadstead, while the tanker Denby Dale settled 
on the bottom of the harbor.124 The Decima had achieved their first success with the SLCs, 
three vessels for a combined 30,000 tons had been sent to the bottom.125 
Analysis: This first success of the SLCs at Gibraltar was due largely in part to the 
experience gained from the previous failed attempts. The clandestine mechanisms in Spain 
used to infiltrate the operators was by now robust enough to make the event almost routine. 
Borghese and the crew of the Scire were also extremely familiar with the navigation 
required to successfully penetrate the Bay of Algeciras, and the operators chosen for the 
SLCs were all experienced men who were veterans of previous missions at Gibraltar.126 
In this manner the major phases of the previous operations had all been essentially full-
dress rehearsals for this operation. A critical aspect toward the success of this operation 
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was that at this point in the campaign the mechanical failures suffered by the SLCs had 
been remedied by this point. This was the first operation with SLCs where not a single craft 
had to abort due to equipment failure. The operators themselves after this mission felt the 
SLCs were finally reliable and effective weapons capable of delivering on early 
promises.127 Of not during this operation was the new methods of active harbor defense 
employed by the British, the SLC operators faced for the first time silent electric boats 
equipped with hydrophones to detect the noise of their SLCs. Every SLC had to dive at 
least once to evade interception during their attack runs and it is likely that if the wind and 
sea state had been calmer they may have been intercepted.128  As it was the operators were 
exposed to depth charges, which to an unprotected diver can be felt as well as heard. The 
British had adopted a tactic of randomly depth charging the bay and harbor to defend 
against underwater attack. This was critical in the decision process of the operators to attack 
less well guarded vessels as their targets rather than their assigned targets.129 Finally, while 
the next attack at Alexandria may be more famous as the Decima’s first real success against 
enemy warships, this attack was unique to SLC operations in that not only were they 
successful in attacking target vessels but also all of the operators involved successfully 
exfiltrated. This fact will be critical to future Decima strategy and tactics. 
2. Scire SLC Attack against Alexandria 18th December 1941 – Success 
Following the success of the SLCs at Gibraltar, Borghese and the Scire with three 
SLCs and their operators are dispatched for an attack on Alexandria. On the evening of the 
18th of December 1941, the Scire surfaced 1.3 miles off of Alexandria to launch the SLCs 
on what would be their most famous attack.130 After the three SLCs were released the 
transit to the harbor entrance was uneventful and the calm seas allowed the SLCs to 
maintain contact with each other. By sheer luck as the SLC operators were searching for a 
way through the barriers a British destroyer approached, and they followed her through the 
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opened net. Once inside the harbor depth charges become an issue of concern for the 
operators, randomly thrown into the harbor in the same manner as Gibraltar, the charges 
caused discomfort to the submerged limbs of the operators and forced them to make their 
approach on the surface, keeping their bodies as much out of the water as they could 
manage to reduce the impacts to their bodies.131 Once inside the harbor all three SLC crews 
successfully placed their charges on targets. By 0600 the following morning the charges 
began to detonate, sinking two battleships the HMS Queen Elizabeth and the HMS Valiant, 
the tanker HMS Sagona, and damaging the destroyer HMS Jervis, which had been 
alongside the Sagona.  
3. Ambra SLC Attack against Alexandria 14 May 1942 – Failure 
The spring following the December success at Alexandria the submarine Ambra 
with three SLCs attempted a similar attack. The Ambra had difficulty navigating and 
released the SLCs just over one mile from the planned insertion point. The SLC pilots are 
never able to get their bearings or identify visual reference points to guide them to the 
harbor at Alexandria. They are spotted on the surface during their approach and forced to 
take evase action, becoming more disoriented in the process all men become lost and never 
able to get their bearings. With their batteries failing after the maneuvers they drove their 
SLCs to shore in the early morning light and were captured shortly after. 
Analysis: The two attacks at Alexandria highlight the vast difference in outcome 
for the same mission profile if the submarine is of course.  
D. A SHIFTING STRATEGY: ENTER THE GAMMA MEN 
After many failures, limited success, and a large cost in men and equipment the 
Decima leadership reevaluated their strategy. Borghese remarks in his account that 
Gibraltar, being as it was the headquarters of the British fleet in the Western Mediterranean, 
had always been, along with Alexandria, a primary target. Recognizing as well that Italian 
aircraft were unable to penetrate the defenses, underwater attack was still the best option 
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due to its inherent surreptitiousness. After studying the three previous missions against 
Gibraltar the leadership of the Decima came to the following conclusions:132 
∑ It was an extremely high-risk operation to use a submarine to penetrate 
British antisubmarine countermeasures in the Bay of Algeciras for each 
attack on Gibraltar.133 
∑ A submarine’s operational effectiveness was limited by several critical 
factors: Transit time from La Spezia, that it could only carry three SLCs at 
a time, and it was limited to conducting operations during the longer 
periods of darkness of the winter months.134 
∑ The special geographical position of Gibraltar, in such proximity to the 
neutral nation of Spain had enabled 22 of 24 operators to return from 
previous missions. Might it also then be more effective to attack targets in 
the Bay of Algeciras and Gibraltar from the Spanish coast?135 
∑ A new softer target had presented itself in the form of dozens of 
unprotected steamers at anchor in the roadstead outside the harbor, only 
hundreds of meters from the Spanish coast.136 
It was with this analysis that the Decima leadership began to shift the strategy of 
the underwater division from a Mahanian decisive blow to a Corbettian contested sea war 
on the periphery approach. Rather than relying on submarine insertion they would utilize 
their existing networks in Spain. If they could successfully infiltrate their operators from 
the Spanish coast operations could continue indefinitely, this would give the enemy no rest, 
 
132 Borghese, 207. 
133 Borghese, 208. 
134 Borghese, 208. 
135 Borghese, 208. 
136 Borghese, 208. 
46 
and force them to commit increased antisubmarine resources toward an enemy they had no 
idea was actually coming from Spain.137 
1. Gamma Swimmer Attack from the Villa Carmella 14 July 1942 – 
Success 
To facilitate attacking Gibraltar from Spain, a Petty officer in the Decima, Antonio 
Ramagnino, suggested a novel approach. Under the guise that his wife was ill and required 
the sun and sea-air of her home country to rehabilitate the newlyweds would honeymoon 
in a bungalow at Maiorga Point. There, on the North coast of Algeciras Bay, only four 
kilometers from Gibraltar, Antonio and his wife readied the house as an observation and 
staging point. They installed a window overlooking the bay, camouflaged to its true nature 
with a cage of parakeets. According to Borghese, in this way the brave and innovative 
actions of the young couple transformed the honeymoon bungalow of the Villa Carmella 
into the most advanced forward operating base of the Italian Navy in enemy territory.138 
Besides twenty-four-hour observation of the British activity around Gibraltar the 
Villa Carmella would allow the first use of the new Gamma swimmers. Without the need 
to breach the outer defenses into Gibraltar there would be no heavy equipment requirement. 
Furthermore, since their targets would be the thin-hulled merchant vessels the Gamma 
swimmers could simply swim out with a few “bug” mines on their belt, light and fast to 
conduct the attack.139  
The first Gamma unit to attack from the Villa Carmela was a twelve-man 
detachment led by LT Agostino Straulino. The men were smuggled into Spain in small 
groups, some overland by foot, some in the false-bottom of a truck, while others travelled 
in the guise as Italian merchant seaman who deserted once reaching the port of Cadiz in 
Spain.140 Once they were together at the Villa Carmela Agostino and his men were 
afforded an opportunity that had never been available to the SLC pilots of previous 
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missions. They studied the rows of vessels during daylight hours and carefully planned 
their attack from their secure base at the honeymoon bungalow. After the necessary 
preparations, on the night of the 13th of July the men slipped into the water at the shoreline 
after simply walking from the Villa Carmela. Fresh and rested and wearing new lightweight 
Pirelli dry suits, rubber swim fins, and seaweed camouflaged head nets they swam out to 
their targets. They played a cat and mouse game with the British surface patrols as they 
attached explosives to their carefully planned and assigned targets and then evaded back to 
the Villa Carmela to regroup and enjoy a spot of warming brandy before linking up with 
Spanish agents to move to Cadiz and repatriation. The next morning four steamers in the 
roadstead, totaling almost ten thousand tons were seriously damaged when the Gamma 
swimmers’ “bugs” detonated.141  
Analysis: This first operation of the Gamma swimmers represents the high degree 
of innovation the Decima had achieved by this point. While the earlier attacks had relied 
on the SLC and therefore submarine or surface transport this new approach allowed attacks 
to be made without conventional naval assets and in doing so circumvented the British 
conventional detection systems and countermeasures. Borghese calls this first operation a 
stunning success, not only in its effect but in that the total cost was one man with back pain 
from the depth charges and another with a foot cut by a British motorboat screw. He also 
highlighted this operation as the first joint and interagency effort undertaken by the Italians, 
involving Navy, Army, and civilian intelligence assets and personnel to facilitate the 
clandestine organization that provided the infiltration and exfiltration mechanisms for the 
operators in Spain142 Finally, this operation represent the first true shift to an 
unconventional or irregular approach for the Decima. Whereas the previous missions could 
be viewed as an extension of submarine warfare, the Scire seemingly firing her SLC 
torpedoes with pilots serving as the terminal guidance to their targets. This operation is 
much more akin to a modern special operation, employing clandestine networks, cover 
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stories, and indigenous partisans, to facilitate highly trained operators utilizing underwater 
capability as a means to an end. 
2. Scire Gamma Attempt on Haifa/El Daba 10 August 1942 – Failure 
After the highly successful Gamma swimmer attack at Gibraltar the Decima 
attempted their final submarine insertion. The Scire was tasked to insert Gamma swimmers 
to attack shipping in the port of El Daba. In an illustration of the hazards to submarine 
operations highlighted above, the Scire was lost when she was detected on approach and 
sunk with all hands including the eleven Gamma men onboard.143 
E. THE PLOT THICKENS: THE STORY OF THE OLTERRA 
When Italy entered the war the steamer Olterra was scuttled in Spanish waters in 
the Bay of Algeciras across from Gibraltar, there she had remained in place for eighteen 
months, rusting and listing, the men aboard living out a meager existence to protect 
property rights. Ramognino, after his time at the Villa Carmela reported on the possibility 
of using her, with her Italian flag and innocent, forgotten state, as a secondary observation 
site.144 The Decima dispatched an agent who approached the owner of the vessel 
concerning her potential use with a vague story citing the war needs of the Italian navy and 
he became, patriot that he was, a willing collaborator. A Spanish company was hired to 
refloat her and she was floated and towed to the end of the outer pier.145 Decima officers 
then proposed that rather than utilize her as a simple observation point she could be refitted 
as a support point based directly across the roadstead from the stronghold of Gibraltar. The 
Olterra could then be used as a fixed-base replacement for the parent submarine that had 
served as the launching vehicle for SLCs.146 A cover plan was devised, a plan that would 
be carried out literally right in view of the windows of the British consulate in Spain. Under 
the command of a Decima officer a replacement “salvage crew” came aboard. This crew 
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was actually comprised of technicians and seamen of the Decima. To sell the ruse the crew 
spent time learning their assumed identities. Before they arrived they crewed aboard a 
civilian steamer moored near their training base in order to learn the “deck technique” the 
manner of the merchant seaman, his dress, slang, how he smoked, spat and ate, all in order 
to complete the deception that they were a salvage and refit merchant crew once they came 
aboard the Olterra.147 The necessary equipment and work associated with a refit provided 
the cover needed to establish an entire workshop for the construction, launch and 
maintenance of SLCs. A compartment in the hold was even turned into a flooded test area 
to check buoyancy and water resistance of the new model of SLCs. An awning was 
constructed, seemingly for the purpose of protecting they crew from the sun while they 
worked to correct the listing in the ship. Its true purpose was to hide an opening cut into 
the side of the vessel connecting the inner flooded compartment to the sea to allow for 
clandestine, below the water line launch and recovery of SLCs.148 In time the Spanish 
guards at the pier, the British Naval Intelligence officers working out of the consulate and 
the Spanish locals became very familiar with the noisy, dirty, unshaven and disheveled 
group of merchant sailors who often could be found frequenting a waterfront tavern or on 
payday seeking out the company of a local woman. They took no notice of them and even 
became familiar enough to call them by half Spanish-Italian nicknames. Never suspecting 
the work going on below decks in secret compartments within the Olterra.149 The other 
advantage the Olterra provided, much like the Villa Carmela, was a continuous forward 
observation post to monitor and record the British patterns of harbor defense patrols, the 
timing of the opening of anti-torpedo nets, and the frequency and locations of depth 
charging. This was a level of intelligence that had never been realized until this point. A 
complete pattern of life for British operations in Gibraltar was developed during the 
Olterra’s “refit” and the construction of the SLCs below her decks. To obtain an even 
greater reconnaissance of British countermeasures fishing became a popular pastime of the 
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crew and afforded opportunities to confirm details of harbor defenses from a closer 
perspective without arousing the suspicion of the British security forces.150 
1. Villa Carmela 2nd Gamma Attack on Gibraltar 14–15 September 
1942 – Success 
While the conversion of the Olterra was underway, including the in-house 
construction of SLCs, a second Gamma swimmer operation was planned. Infiltrating as 
before by utilizing Spanish agents and the clandestine mechanisms in place, a team of five 
Gamma swimmers utilized the vantage point of the Olterra to plan and prepare for the 
operation. On the night of 14 September three Gamma swimmers staged at and departed 
from the Villa Carmela, while two remained in support and reserve. The swimmers were 
able to place their charges on their assigned target without compromise and by the morning 
of 15 September the Gamma men were already exfiltrating Spain on their way back to Italy 
as their charges detonated and the steamer Raven’s Point sank in the roadstead.151 
2. Olterra SLC Attack on Gibraltar 8 December 1942 – Failure 
After months of preparation, three SLCs launched from below the waterline 
through the Olterra’s secret door. All three suffered steering issues after launch and had to 
return to the Olterra to have them remedied before relaunching. Unfortunately for the 
operators, by this point the harbor defenses at Gibraltar were at their heaviest. Each SLC 
was caught on the surface and became the targets of machine gun fire and depth charges. 
The mission was aborted, but not before three men were killed and two captured in the 
attempt, with one man returning to the Olterra.152 
Analysis: Although ultimately a failure, due to the high level of active 
countermeasures employed by the British, this operation was the first operational success 
of the Olterra as a launch platform. This first SLC attempt from the Olterra was most 
notable in that this was the first operation that SLCs suffering mechanical issues could 
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return to their host launch platform for repairs and reset rather than simply aborting the 
mission, an advantage the Olterra had over the submarines that had been used as launch 
platforms in previous operations. By contrast, the Gamma operation carried out was 
executed flawlessly. The critical difference in the two operations carried out from the 
Olterra and the Villa Carmela is the reduced signature of the Gamma swimmers compared 
to the SLCs, which lent them more apt to slip by British patrols, and the nature of the 
targets. The soft targets of the steamers in the roadstead assigned to the Gamma men vs. 
the hardened target of the Gibraltar harbor assigned to the SLC pilots. 
3. Ambra SLC and Gamma Joint Attack against Algiers 11 Dec 1942 – 
Success 
Following the successful employment of the Gamma swimmers at Gibraltar the 
Decima attempted their first and only combined approach. On 11 December, the submarine 
Ambra successfully inserted three SLCs and ten Gamma swimmers outside the harbor. In 
another demonstration of a low-tech innovative approach to counter British detection 
equipment the Ambra reduced  her electromagnetic signature on approach by using a 
Gamma swimmer on the surface as an observer connected via an underwater telephone to 
guide the submarine in while she remained submerged. Two SLCs were successful in 
sinking two vessels and damaging another. The Gamma swimmers successfully sunk two 
vessels. Unfortunately, without the safe haven of a nearby third-party nation like Spain at 
Gibraltar, or a clandestine exfiltration network, all sixteen operators were captured. The 
results against the enemy were also far less than Decima leadership had hoped given the 
commitment of such a large force of operators.153 
4. Olterra SLC 2nd Mission against Gibraltar 8 May 1943 – Success 
After the failure of the 8 December, SLC operation it was decided that British 
defenses in the harbor at Gibraltar were too effective and focus shifted to the merchant 
shipping lying at anchor, since it was both nearer to the launch point and under less 
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protection.154  On the evening of the 8 May, 1943, coordinated with the phase of the moon 
and a storm in the bay of Algeciras, making both hydrophonic and visual detection of the 
SLCs by the British more difficult, three SLCs were launched from the hidden door below 
the waterline in the Olterra’s hull. Each craft was fitted with double warheads and assigned 
two targets, although the stormy weather and the British vigilance caused trouble for the 
SLCs, forcing each craft to repeat their attack runs, one crew six times (something they had 
never been able to do before during operations from the Scire) each SLC succeeded in 
mining one steam freighter each and successfully returned to the Olterra through the 
hidden opening. Rejoining their companion’s topside as merchant seaman they waited for 
their charge timers to go off.155 Then at six in the morning on the 9th the Bay of Algeciras 
was rocked by explosions. Within minutes the Pat Harrison, the Mahsud, and the 
Camerata each sank and were broken up for a total of 20,000 tons of enemy shipping sent 
to the bottom.156  
5. Olterra SLC Final Attack at Gibraltar 4 August 1943 – Success 
In the final attack on Gibraltar on the night of 3 August, three SLCs launched from 
the Olterra succeeded in sinking the steamers Harrison Gray Otis, Thorshovdi, and the 
Standridge for a total of 23,000 tons.157 Although the construction and launch of SLCs 
below deck on the Olterra had been refined to the point of becoming almost routine, and 
the SLC pilots’ skills honed to the highest level, due to man-power shortages one 
inexperienced operator became separated from his SLC during the placing of the warhead 
on the Harrison Gray Otis when they encountered the latest British innovative 
countermeasure, barbed wire hanging from the hull. He was caught on the surface and 
captured shortly before the charges detonated.158 
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Analysis: The final attacks by Decima SLC operators from the Olterra represent 
the highest refinement of strategy, tactics, training, and equipment of the SLC group during 
the war. These attacks demonstrate the effectiveness of the synthesis of clandestine 
networks, forward operating bases, experienced operators, and reliable equipment. Decima 
deception efforts are also notable during this final phase in Gibraltar. During the attacks 
Spanish agents had scattered divers’ equipment along the north coast of Gibraltar, in an 
effort to lead the British to believe that a submarine had penetrated the harbor and released 
the divers.159 Borghese cites the testimony of Frank Goldsworthy, a British Naval 
Intelligence Officer at the time, years after the war, “We never found any proof of the part 
played by the Olterra in this affair. “160 During the entire operational employment of the 
converted Olterra the British never discovered the origin of the attacks.161 Figure 5 is a 
sketch of the Gibraltar operational area. Note the proximity of the Villa Carmella to the 
release point used by the Scire for SLC operations, also note the location of the Olterra 
directly across the Bay of Algeciras and that these two forward operating positions 
provided ninety-degree observational perspective.  
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Figure 5. Gibraltar Operational Area162 
F. FINAL ACT: AN ACTIVE DEFENSE 
With the lessons learned from the success of employing Gamma swimmers from 
clandestine bases, and a realization of the impending allied offensive, the Decima shifted 
to what Borghese calls an Active Defense Strategy. In Sardinia three clandestine operative 
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bases were organized to attack invading fleets, at Cagliari a cavern was readied in the 
masonry of the mole to support underground swimmer operations against allied landings. 
With the aim of targeting enemy shipping by setting fire to petrol reserves that ran into the 
harbor once it was full of allied ships in support of an invasion.163 Similar preparations 
were made at Syracuse, Augusta, and Catania to lie in wait for the British.164 Small groups 
of swimmers were organized in neutral harbors, and under disguise they acted at night 
when enemy shipping presented itself, a base was established on board the Italian steamer 
Gaeta, and other bases camouflaged to blend in with the local scenery at Malaga, 
Barcelona, Lisbon, and Oporto.165 
Of each of these clandestine swimmer efforts the one that is the most well 
documented and what Borghese labelled the most brilliant enterprise, are Sub-Lieutenant 
Ferraro’s secret missions. Italian Naval Intelligence had learned that the Turkish ports of 
Alexandretta and Mersina were being used to load chromium vital to the allied war effort. 
Luigi Ferraro, an athlete and expert swimmer, with the help of a Naval Intelligence 
specialist was assigned as an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and dispatched 
to the Italian consulate at Alexandretta.166 A Naval Intelligence petty officer, who was 
intimately acquainted with a typist at the ministry of foreign affairs, had persuaded her to 
provide a passport, official paperwork, and the official rubber stamp to the Decima. In this 
way Ferraro, now under the guise of a consular employee reported with four heavy 
suitcases bearing diplomatic seals to the vice-consul at Alexandretta.167 Ferraro was 
introduced quickly, by Giovanni Roccardi the clerk at the consulate, but really a naval 
secret service officer who had first brought to attention the possibility of  attacking enemy 
shipping in port, into the local fashionable consular society.168 As Ferraro became 
acquainted with his surroundings he could be spotted on the beach every day, where he 
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made it very apparent to any observer that although he enjoyed the beach, he could not 
swim. After the sun set every night he danced and drank at the local cafés. He was 
especially fond of and adept at playing hand ball and bowling on the beach, and every 
evening he carried a large box down to the waterfront from the Italian consul’s beach house 
and he made a show of taking out the necessary gaming gear and used it in front of every 
one until it grew dark and he put it away for the night.169 By 30 June 1943, any suspicion 
or curiosity about the new young Italian diplomat had faded away within the close-knit 
circles of the consulates and the British intelligence agents assigned to Ferraro and 
Roccardi had relaxed.170 
1. 17 Sub Lieutenant Ferraro’s attack at Alexandretta 30 June 1943 – 
Success 
On this evening Ferraro and Roccardi seemed more competitive than usual in a 
fierce game of bowling and didn’t seem to notice as the sun went down and the usual crowd 
on the beach thinned. As soon as they were alone Ferraro used the beach cabin to change 
into his Pirelli dry suit, swim fins, oxygen rebreather, and seaweed net headdress. (the by 
now standardized garb of a Gamma swimmer). He also carried two limpet mines at his 
waist. He entered the water with Roccardi in overwatch and swam just over two kilometers 
until he reached the Greek vessel Orion, a 7000-ton freighter loaded with Chromium. He 
approached slowly and evaded search lights and sentries and used his lightweight breathing 
device to go sub-surface and attach his limpets to the bilge keel with clamps and armed the 
speed activated fuses by pulling the safety pins.171 He swam back to shore to link up with 
Roccardi and was dry and in the consulate by four the next morning. One week later the 
Orion had finished her onloading and weighed anchor, bound for the allied war effort. The 
limpets detonated in Syrian waters, she was so heavily laden she sank in minutes, and the 
survivors reported she had been torpedoed at sea.172 
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2. 18 Ferraro’s attack at Mersina 8 July 1943 – Success 
On the 8th of July, at the neighboring port of Mersina. Ferraro and Roccardi had 
departed Alexandretta for the day with their diplomatic suitcases. After a day of bathing 
and games on the beach that evening at Mersina they returned the next day to Alexandretta 
unnoticed. The Kaituna, a freighter of 10,000 tons, who was also very modern and well 
equipped with armament, finished her onloading and departed on the 19th, once at sea one 
of the two limpets placed on her by Ferraro detonated and she barely avoided sinking by 
running aground on the coast of Cyprus.173 
3. 19 Ferraro’s second attack at Mersina 30 July 1943 – Fail* 
On the 30th of July, again at Mersina, Ferraro, wearing a bath robe over his dry suit 
and breathing device, walked down to the beach just after ten that night. Roccardi assisted 
him in his final equipment checks and preparing his limpet mines. Shortly before eleven 
he entered the water, swam four kilometers to reach his target, the Sicilian Prince, and was 
back ashore by four the next morning and back in Alexandretta a few hours later. 
Unfortunately, this target escaped due to Royal Navy clearance divers inspecting her hull 
before departure after the lesson of the Kaituna.174 
4. 20 Ferraro’s second attack at Alexandretta 2 August 1943 – Success 
On the 2nd  of August Ferraro carried out his final attack. The Norwegian freighter 
Fernplant, of 7000 tons, loaded with chromium, was attacked in the same manner as his 
previous operations. Figure 6 depicts Ferraro’s typical mission profile. When she made her 
final departure on the 5th she sunk after a few hours at sea. (Having even avoided a 
premature detonation during a movement on the 4th but the speed driven propellors on the 
limpets had not attained the necessary speed to arm the fuses.)175 Having used up all his 
charges smuggled in diplomatic cases the consulate employee Ferraro came down with a 
sudden case of Malaria on the 8th of August and was sent to a hospital in Italy to recover. 
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In a single month Ferraro and Roccardi, acting alone and decentralized, had sunk or 
damaged 24,000 tons of shipping.176 
 
Figure 6. Ferraro’s Gamma Operations177 
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Analysis: If the final mission of the SLCs at Gibraltar represents the highest 
refinement for SLC operations, then the actions of Ferraro and Roccardi represent the 
highest level of refinement for the employment of Gamma swimmers. While Spain had 
provided a semi-permissive environment from which to operate through clandestine 
networks the consulate at Alexandretta provided a fully permissive environment from 
which to stage an attack. By this point in the war the Decima fully appreciate the value of 
overt cover as a means to infiltrate and stage underwater attacks. What is also notable is 
the final refinement of the limpet devices and the value of the time and speed fuse both in 
allowing the swimmer to exfiltrate the area and in non-attribution, in the one case the 
survivors even determining that they had been torpedoed at sea. Finally, Ferraro’s missions 
represent the highest attainment of economy of force, and frequency of action, in that with 
a force of only two men and within a time span of a single month four operations are 
executed with a combined result of 24,000 tons of allied shipping and war materials 
destroyed.  
G. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DECIMA MAS UNDERWATER 
OPERATIONS 
1. Introduction 
Utilizing statistical analysis through a contingency table the twenty underwater 
operations of the Decima MAS can be analyzed for their effectiveness and cost. The Decima 
conducted underwater ship attacks through two primary means, either by SLC or Gamma 
swimmer attack. They also employed three methods of insertion of each force: submarine, 
surface vessel, and shore, which includes the converted Olterra lying pier side across from 
Gibraltar. Submarine-launched missions and the single mission against Malta using surface 
vessels can be grouped into a standard launch category. While by grouping shore launched 
missions such as those from the Villa Carmela in Spain and Ferraro’s missions in Mersina 
and Alexandretta with the missions launched from the Olterra a non-standard category is 
created. Non-standard launched category vs. a standard-launched category are represented 
by “NS” and “S” respectively in the contingency table. Operations are further divided by 
the unit that conducted them into categories labelled SLC, and Gamma, or Joint for the 
single operation that employed both SLCs and Gamma swimmers. Finally, each operation 
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category is labeled S or F for success and failure, respectively. Traditionally the criterion 
for evaluation of success of Decima operations has simply been if the operation had the 
desired effect of disabling the target vessel.178 That is the first criterion utilized in this 
analysis. Recognizing that other criteria in addition to effects on target are more useful to 
Special Operations planners, additional criteria are introduced that are relevant to the 
context of GPC and the modern employment of SOF. The first of these is the risk to force, 
defined by if the operation in question resulted in the death or capture of the operators. In 
today’s politically sensitive environment and especially within the competitive space there 
is a much higher expectation by civilian and military leadership to reduce the risk that the 
special operators involved in an operation will become casualties or become compromised 
or captured than there was during World War II. The second additional criterion is, 
likelihood of attribution. Once again, given the context of today’s competitive environment 
non-attribution lends options to SOF leadership both in lessening the potential political 
effects of an operation and in providing future options by not triggering an adversary to 
modify their defensive posture or counter-measures. The variety of Decima operations 
provides examples of both sides of these effects. 
2. Success Criteria 1 
Table 1. Success Criterion 1 Contingency Table 
Unit S=S S=F NS=S NS=F Total 
SLC 2 7* 2 1 12 
Gamma 0 1** 5 1*** 7 
Joint 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 3 8 7 2 20 
 
Probability Conclusions: 
∑ Probability a random selected mission was a success? 11/20 
∑ Used SLCs with standard insertion and success? 2/12 
 
178 West, “Frogmen 2.0: Combat Swimmers in the Era of Great Power Competition,” 29. 
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∑ SLCs with non-standard insertion and success? 2/12 
∑ SLC and success? 4/12 
∑ Gamma swimmer with non-standard insertion and success? 5/7 
∑ Gamma swimmer with standard insertion and success? 0/7 
∑ Gamma swimmer and success? 5/7 
∑ Standard insertion and success? 4/20 
∑ Non-standard insertion and success? 7/20 
 
3. Success Criteria 2 
When the contingency table is redone with the additional criteria that only those 
operations in which the Operators from both SLC and Gamma groups were both able to 
carry out their ship attack and were not captured or killed as the definition of a successful 
operation the output shifts the success rate to that illustrated in Table 2. 
Table 2. Success Criteria 2 Contingency Table 
Unit S=S S=F NS=S NS=F Total 
SLC 1 8* 1 2 12 
Gamma 0 1** 5 1*** 7 
Joint 0 1 0 0 1 
Total 1 10 6 3 20 
 
By these criteria, the original successes of the Scire SLC attack at Alexandria, the 
joint mission executed by the Ambra with both SLCs and Gamma swimmers against 





∑ Probability a random selected mission was a success? 7/20 
∑ Used SLCs with standard insertion and success? 1/12 
∑ SLCs with non-standard insertion and success? 1/12 
∑ SLC and success? 2/12 
∑ Gamma swimmer with non-standard insertion and success? 5/7, no change 
∑ Gamma swimmer with sub insertion and success? 0/7, no change 
∑ Gamma swimmer and success? 5/7, no change  
∑ Standard insertion and success? 1/20 
∑ Non-standard insertion and success? 6/20 
 
4. Success Criteria 3 
When the additional criterion is added that a successful mission must include both 
the placing of a charge that results in the disablement of the target vessel, the return of the 
operators, and that is non-attributional the success contingency table shifts thus: 
Table 3. Success Criteria 3 Contingency Table 
Unit S=S S=F NS=S NS=F Total 
SLC 0 9* 1 2 12 
Gamma 0 1** 5 1*** 7 
Joint 0 1 0 0 1 
Total 0 11 6 3 20 
 
The single successful operation of the Scire with SLCs against Gibraltar was 
attributed to two-man submersible operations in the British admiralty report. Thus, the only 
operations that are considered successes by the additional criteria are those carried out by 
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Gamma swimmers operating from shore, or SLCs launched in a non-standard means from 
the Olterra. 
Probability Conclusions 
∑ Probability a random selected mission was a success? 6/20
∑ Used SLCs with standard insertion and success? 0
∑ SLCs with non-standard insertion and success? 1/12
∑ SLC and success? 1/12
∑ Gamma swimmer with non-standard insertion and success? 5/7, no change
∑ Gamma swimmer with standard insertion and success? 0/7, no change
∑ Gamma swimmer and success? 5/7, no change
∑ Standard insertion and success? 0
∑ Non-standard insertion and success? 6/20, no change 
5. Conclusion
There is a strong relationship between the use of standard insertion and the 
likelihood of failure for Decima MAS underwater operations during World War II. When 
success is simply defined by the disablement of the target vessel a randomly chosen 
operation from the sample has an 11/20 chance of success. While an operation utilizing 
standard insertion has only a 4/20 chance of success. Furthermore, there is a slight 
relationship between the use of SLCs and failure, as a mission using SLCs has a 4/12 
chance of success contrasted with a Gamma swimmer operation which has a 5/7 chance of 
success. An SLC operation using standard methods for initial insertion had only a 2/12 
chance of success while a Gamma swimmer operation with non-standard insertion had a 
5/7 chance of success. SLC and standard insertion operations represented the highest risk 
to success and the highest cost in resources, while the Gamma swimmer with non-standard 
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insertion was the highest chance of success with the lowest cost in resources at a four times 
greater chance of success (even after accounting for the Gamma operation thwarted by the 
RNCDs) without requiring submarine or surface vessel support or SLCs. When the 
additional criteria of the return of the operators and non-attribution is considered the trend 
continues to weight in favor of Gamma group and non-standard insertion methods. With a 
randomly selected mission from the table having a 6/20 chance of success, an SLC 
operation having a 1/12 chance of success, and SLCs and Gamma swimmers launched from 
standard methods zero chance of success. While the Gamma group inserted by non-
standard means remains at the original 5/7 chance of success. This represents an almost 
nine times higher probability of success when defined by all three criteria for a Gamma 
swimmer inserted by non-standard methods over an SLC inserted by standard methods. 
 
* Includes the aborted attempt by the Scire to attack Gibraltar 
** This attempt the Gamma swimmers were never released, the submarine Scire was 
compromised and sunk on approach. 
*** Although the attack was executed with success, this attempt is qualified as a failure 
due to Royal Navy Clearance Divers hull inspection before the charge detonated. 
 
H. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS OF DECIMA MAS OPERATIONS 
As the operational record has shown the Decima MAS underwater operations 
division shifted their focus from attacking hard targets with SLCs to an active defense 
utilizing Gamma swimmers targeting softer merchant shipping with miniaturized 
ordinance. This shift in tactics and equipment reflects an overall shift in strategy from a 
Mahanian approach to a Corbettian one. The shifting strategy of the Decima MAS played 
an overarching role in influencing doctrine, training, and technology adaptation. In the span 
of a thirty-six-month campaign their overall strategy, doctrine, tactics, and equipment was 
shifted to achieve a statistically significant shift from failure to success and from high to 
low cost in resources. So while the Decima may be most famous for their SLC operations 
against hardened targets like Alexandria, their lesser known but statistically less costly and 
more successful operations; such as the SLC launches from the Olterra against Gibraltar 
and those conducted by Gamma swimmers at ports such as Mersina and Alexandretta 
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represent the greatest successes of the Decima. These are also the most relevant examples 
for modern SOF evaluating the feasibility of underwater operations within the context of 
Great Power Competition. 
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V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  FINDINGS APPLICABLE TO U.S. SOF  
1. Organizational 
a. Small Group Innovation 
Small is beautiful, just as Jensen’s theory suggests, small groups often produce the 
most innovative ideas. In the case of the Decima some of their most innovative and creative 
ideas were the result of junior officers and petty officers’ suggestions. Ideas that would 
never have evolved from conventional naval leadership steeped in the traditions of capital 
ships of the line. Even the submarine officers, who arguably were already members of a 
smaller, less conventional, and more innovative arm, generally defaulted to utilizing the 
Decima operators as an extension of submarine warfare. Non-naval solutions such as 
operating from the Villa Carmela, the steamer Olterra, or the consulate at Alexandretta 
evolved from the minds of junior leaders looking to solve a problem outside of the bounds 
of their parent organization’s traditional approach to the maritime domain. 
b. Flexible Doctrine 
One of the most difficult areas for a military organization to innovate is it doctrinal 
mindset, and often because of the deep-rooted bureaucracy that is often protected by and 
in turn supports it. In Jensen’s Forging the Sword his case study of the U.S. Army examined 
the doctrinal change that occurred over a thirty-year period. What is stunning about the 
Decima case study in this research is the degree of doctrinal innovation the Decima 
achieved in a mere thirty-six months. They achieved this change against the same type of 
deep bureaucracy and tradition that is inherent to any conventional military organization. 
Even within their own underwater division, which was led by submarine officers, the 
Decima shifted their tactics from essentially submarine warfare to a maritime irregular 
warfare approach as a result of this foundational shift in doctrine. 
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c. Incubators, Advocacy, and Leadership 
The Decima began as an extension of the Italian navy submarine force with an 
emphasis on undersea warfare centered around the employment of a weapon, the SLC. 
Within thirty-six months they were operating as a fully-fledged joint special operations 
unit centered on operational effects and utilizing their operators in the best manner to 
achieve the desired effects. This shift from a “man the equipment” weapons-centered 
approach to an “equip the man” human centered approach is a hallmark of shifting from 
conventional to a special operations or unconventional mindset. As stated above it reflects 
the importance of grass-roots ideas that shaped an evolving strategy, doctrine, and training 
plan. But these grass-roots idea incubators as Jensen labels them, would not have been 
successful in changing the organization without the advocacy of leadership within and 
outside of the organization. Leadership protected and encouraged the incubators and 
facilitated the advocacy network that led to the kind of rapid change that allowed the 
Decima to achieve their greatest success despite an alert and constantly evolving peer-level 
adversary. 
2. Operational 
a. Forward Basing 
The Decima shifted their insertion methods from submarine launched to forward-
based clandestine locations throughout the course of the campaign. As analysis has shown, 
this produced a statistically relevant improvement in the likelihood of mission success. 
Previous failures had been very often, as the case study has shown, due to the effectiveness 
of British early warning and detection equipment and anti-submarine warfare forces. By 
forward basing their SLC and Gamma groups they effectively rendered the detection ability 
of the British null by simply avoiding it. Additionally, as we have seen in the case of all 
three forward locations, these sites provided continuous intelligence through observation 
of enemy forces and the ability to attack quickly at targets of opportunity at any time. 
Forward basing improved the survivability of the Decima operators, provided an increased 
situational awareness, and allowed a higher frequency of operations. 
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b. Local clandestine networks 
As the study has shown a critical factor toward making forward basing a success 
was that it was facilitated by local clandestine networks. These same networks also 
facilitated the return of the Decima operators as well. Clandestine support networks 
enabled the forward-basing and therefore the circumventing of the British primary means 
of countering Decima underwater operations. By allowing the return of the operators the 
networks and the mechanisms they established greatly reduced the risk to force, 
additionally, the return of the operators reduced the cost of the operations in man power 
and training. Contrast the success at Alexandria of the SLCs after which all operators were 
captured to the SLC operations at Gibraltar where the operators returned to fight another 
day.  
c. Target Selection 
As the Decima shifted their strategy and in turn modified their doctrine, they also 
shifted their focus from hard to soft targets. No longer seeking a decisive knock-out blow 
against British ships of the line they were able to take advantage of the softer unprotected 
shipping targets that presented themselves outside of the secure harbors. In this manner 
they transitioned to shaping the battlefield over a sustained campaign instead of attempting 
to rebalance power quickly. As the Decima learned, combat divers are extremely 
vulnerable to even mild counter measures, and a vigilant opponent can render subsurface 
offensive operations all but impossible. The allies did not have the resources to defend all 
the shipping, and this shift in Decima operations allowed them to maximize their strengths 
against the enemies’ vulnerabilities rather than curtailing operations. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. SPECIAL FORCES 
1. Context and Challenges 
In the introduction chapter this study highlighted that while the joint operational 
environment of Iraq and Afghanistan has led to greater interoperability between U.S. SOF 
conducting joint and combined land operations the same has not extend to the maritime 
domain. That chapter also highlighted that often the very suggestion of non-Naval SOF 
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conducting maritime or underwater operations is met with great institutional resistance. 
This is especially true within the Special Forces Regiment despite the fact that there is both 
the doctrinal mandate and historical precedence for each SOF service to maintain an 
underwater capability.179 This study posits that this organizational resistance is attributed 
to three shortfalls: An inflexible Doctrine, “Sea Blindness,” and Multi-Domain atrophy. 
2. Doctrine  
An assumption for this study is that Special Forces core missions and tasks will 
required to be executed throughout a multi-domain environment regardless of service 
branch.180 Yet while there is standardization and interoperability in underwater equipment 
and training among U.S. SOF, the doctrinal guidance for the use of underwater capability 
by Special Forces is limited to infiltration and reconnaissance and primarily conflict-
focused.181 This limitation ignores both the potential for Army Special Forces to utilize 
underwater capability in gaining access to partner forces as a means of maintaining forward 
presence and influence within Great Power Competition. The doctrinal mindset also 
governs the training in that the cumulative exercises focus on ODA infiltration of a denied 
area to conduct other missions.182 While it is certainly one aspect of underwater capability, 
a more likely scenario and one relevant to Great Power Competition is the training, and 
enabling of local partner or indigenous forces in the use of underwater methods of mobility 
to conduct various forms of reconnaissance, clandestine movement, and maritime 
disablement and sabotage. Doctrine that would allow for Army Special Forces to train on 
and execute maritime sabotage would enable an institutional mindset switch in a manner 
much like the Decima. It would also allow for a greater integration of forward based 
indigenous maritime clandestine networks into any future underwater operations in the 
event of conflict. Finally, by overtly working with partners in this doctrinal approach 
 
179 Air Land Sea Application Center, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military 
Diving Operations, 1. 
180 Doctrine For Army Special Operations Forces FM 100-25, 1–1. 
181 Air Land Sea Application Center, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military 
Diving Operations, 57. 
 
71 
greater resistance, resilience, and influence could be fostered and serve as a potential cost-
inducer and deterrent to America’s adversaries within the competitive space. 
3. Sea Blindness  
A doctrinal shift in the application of Army Special Forces underwater capability 
would also lead to a reduced “Sea Blindness” in the force. As stated in the introductory 
chapter these terrain-based blinders inhibit SOF planners from recognizing the maritime 
domain and littoral regions as maneuver space. Instead regarding the maritime domain and 
the littorals as an obstacle to be overcome rather than an area of opportunity.183 At the 
same time Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) and illicit groups have taken full 
advantage of the gaps and seams in these areas. Correcting Sea Blindness would enable 
greater illumination of VEO activity in the littorals, while also permitting forward presence 
that would counter Great Power and in particular Chinese Maritime Grand Strategy, while 
providing indigenous networks that would enable the potential use of underwater 
capability. 
4. Multi-domain Atrophy 
As stated before, these fundamental shortfalls have produced a disparity between 
doctrine, training, and operational employment within the Special Forces underwater 
operations community. A flexible doctrine, and increased awareness of the potential for 
underwater operations to build partner capacity, gain a forward presence and influence, 
illuminate VEO networks, and remain competitive in the GPC arena will prioritize the 
fostering of protective leadership and advocacy groups within the Special Forces Regiment 
and the greater SOF community to encourage the incubation of new ideas and innovative 
technology approaches. This will correct the multi-domain atrophy that has taken place 
over the last two decades and provide another tool in the kit bag for Special Forces to 
remain the preferred partner in the competitive realm.  
 
183 Meghan Curran Et Al., “Violence At Sea: How Terrorists, Insurgents, And Other Extremists 
Exploit The Maritime Domain,” Stable Seas, August 2020, 1. 
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
How is the Program of Instruction (POI) developed? 
What is the annual throughput of the course, does this meet operational demand? 
How often is the POI reviewed? Who approves it? 
Does the POI reflect current operational priorities of units in the field? What Methods 
determine this? 
Is there a method to capture and record lessons learned from training? The operational 
force? 
What type if any collaboration takes place with the sister service schoolhouses? Does this 
program train the joint force? Annual throughput?  
Is there a formalized feedback method for the operational force to provide input on the 
end user product? 
Is there a method to conduct research, development, or innovation in equipment, TTPs, 
POI development? 
Does the schoolhouse have the authority to test/certify new equipment for the force? If 
the schoolhouse does not have this authority what method exists to communicate 
operational requirements to the testing authority? 
Does the schoolhouse provide advanced training opportunities to operational units? How 
often annually? What is the method for scheduling with the force? 
Does the schoolhouse coordinate for training with conventional units outside the SOF 
community? NATO SOF or conventional forces? How often annually? 
Is the schoolhouse available for foreign partner nation students to attend? How many and 
which nations annually? 
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